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ABSTRACT 
On the last day of the last term the Court split 5-4 in a controversial 
and contentious Janus decision with a dissent read from the bench. 
The dissent argued, in large part, that States should be free to permit 
public-sector unions to continue to assess employees who do not join 
the union agency fees, even if some of these employees object to 
associating with the unions’ political objectives and strategies, in 
order to overcome the free-rider problem where nonmembers enjoy 
the collective bargaining benefits achieved without paying for them. 
The majority held that overcoming the free-rider problem was 
insufficient grounds for perpetuating an intrusion into First 
Amendment rights. Both sides overlooked a far larger free-rider 
problem. Public-sector labor unions are a well-defined and cohesive 
coalition that is organized to divert more taxpayer resources to their 
coalition. Due to the free-rider problem, taxpayers have difficulty 
organizing a strong defense against this coalition. This Article 
discusses some economic principles, some differences between 
historical labor unions in the private sector and modern public-sector 
labor unions, and the Janus decision.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees, Council 31,1 the Supreme Court voted five to 
four in favor of the plaintiff, Mark Janus, who sought to be excluded 
from mandatory union representation fees for employees of the State 
of Illinois.2 The conservative majority hailed the result as a relatively 
simple and straightforward victory for the First Amendment.3 
Meanwhile, the liberal dissenting justices screamed that this was a 
gross injustice for the principle of stare decisis and asserted that the 
decision would wreck the important work of labor unions brought 
about by free-riders capturing the benefits of unionization without 
paying for them.4 
This Article explores the development of unions while reviewing 
some basic economic principles, then it reviews the majority and 
dissenting opinions.5 Afterwards, both legal and economic analysis are 
provided.6 I argue that the conservative majority missed an important 
 
 1. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 2. See id. at 2459–60 (concluding that Illinois law violates free speech rights 
of union nonmembers). 
 3. See id. at 2486 (“This procedure violates the First Amendment and cannot 
continue.”). 
 4. See id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for setting 
aside precedent and preventing “the American people, acting through their state and 
local officials, from making important choices about workplace governance”). 
 5. See infra Parts II, III. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
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economic argument and opportunity to turn the free-rider problem the 
other way.7 In the early history of the American labor movement, an 
important objective of unionization was to capture, share, and 
redistribute part of the monopoly profits created by industry with the 
workers who helped create them.8 However, in the context of public 
employees, there are no monopoly profits to capture.9 Instead the 
unions capture a portion of the public’s tax assessments,10 and they are 
able to do this by virtue of the free-rider problem, which 
disincentivizes any particular taxpayer from complaining because they 
pay such a trivial share of the costs inflicted by the public unions that 
their marginal benefit of reducing their own tax burden is always 
greatly outweighed by their marginal cost of fighting the union for 
public employees.11  
The Supreme Court’s opinions in this case are divisive opinions 
about an economic issue written with little economic theory or facts. 
A little more economic analysis might lead to the same result with 
broader support and less hostile language. I hope to encourage use of 
more thorough economic theory in future decisions. 
I. MONOPOLIES, CARTELS, AND LABOR UNIONS 
One hundred years ago America was a very different 
environment.12 There were no interstate highways.13 The vast majority 
 
 7. See infra Section IV.B. 
 8. See RICHARD T. ELY, THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 46–50 
(1886) (describing the history of American labor and noting that labor began to 
organize to curtail abusive practices by capitalists in the 1800s). 
 9. See DANIEL DISALVO, GOVERNMENT AGAINST ITSELF 27 (2015) (“In 
government it is harder to measure efficiency and productivity for agencies and 
workers because they often lack clearly defined goals and missions—to say nothing 
of the objective measurement of success used in the private sector, namely, profit.”). 
 10. See MALLORY FACTOR, SHADOWBOSSES xii (2012) (“Unlike private 
sector unions, government employee unions grow our government at the expense of 
the taxpayers. . . . When these unions win, all taxpayers lose . . . .”). 
 11. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 473–75 (2003) 
(discussing the logic of collective action and concluding that large interest groups are 
less effective than small interest groups). 
 12. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 2 (1999) 
(“[T]oday’s business world is different in a myriad of ways from that of a century 
ago.”). 
 13. See, e.g., The History of Interstate Highways in California, CAL. DEP’T 
OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.ca.gov/interstate/CAinterstates.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
Q6EY-FU7N] (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) (stating that the first interstate highway 
under the Federal Highway and Defense Act of 1956 opened in California in 1957). 
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did not own automobiles,14 and the few automobiles around were not 
capable of long-distance, high-speed travel.15 Workers worked within 
walking distance of home.16 This frequently meant that they had only 
one employment choice.17 There were no social safety nets, such as 
welfare.18 Terms of employment were offered on a “take it or leave it” 
basis, and given the economic fact that declining the employment 
could mean starvation, workers would take employment under 
conditions that now seem unfair, harsh, and dangerous.19  
Large and powerful firms did not merely exploit labor. They 
damaged small businesses and consumers too.20 James May writes, 
[L]ate nineteenth-century American firms in large numbers sought 
protection and better returns through various forms of mutual cooperation, 
ranging from such “loose” combinations as simple cartels or pools, to such 
tighter combinations as trusts, holding companies, and mergers, entered into 
with willing or coerced partners. Such tighter combinations at least 
theoretically offered possibilities of new productive or managerial 
efficiencies not achievable through simple “loose” arrangements. At the 
same time, large firms, now increasingly organized as managerially run 
corporations, repeatedly employed at times ruthless predatory tactics to 
eliminate or undercut existing rivals or to exclude potential new entrants 
from their markets. With unsettling frequency during the Gilded Age and 
 
 14. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/vehicles/fact-
962-january-30-2017-vehicles-capita-other-regionscountries-compared-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/4E3V-6T7X] (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) (showing eleven motor 
vehicles, including trucks and buses, per 100,000 people in 1900). 
 15. See Christopher Klein, The First Great American Road Trip, HISTORY 
(June 29, 2012), https://www.history.com/news/the-first-great-american-road-trip 
[https://perma.cc/ZC9Y-B37J] (highlighting the first transcontinental automobile trip, 
which occurred in 1903 and took sixty-four days). 
 16. See Derek Thompson, America in 1915: Long Hours, Crowded Houses, 
Death by Trolley, THE ATL. (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2016/02/america-in-1915/462360/ [https://perma.cc/BK4L-N2TU] 
(“Americans didn’t drive: They walked, rode horses, and acrobatically dodged 
trolleys. In the last 100 years, perhaps nothing about daily life has changed more than 
the commute.”). 
 17. Cf. HARDY GREEN, THE COMPANY TOWN 3 (2010) (“By one estimate, 
more than 2,500 single-enterprise towns once dotted the country.”). 
 18. See How Welfare Began in the United States, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
FOUND., http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-14-3-a-how-welfare-
began-in-the-united-states.html [https://perma.cc/9574-NVXS] (last visited Nov. 11, 
2019) (“In 1935, welfare for poor children and other dependent persons became a 
federal government responsibility, which it remained for 60 years.”). 
 19. See GREEN, supra note 17, at 57–74 (describing conditions in company 
towns organized around coal mining). 
 20. Cf. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 401 (2d ed. 
1997) (explaining that “[c]onsumer groups and injured businesses tend to support 
[antitrust policy]”). 
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the Progressive Era, powerful firms such as Standard Oil also sought to gain 
advantage over their rivals in the political realm, by bribing legislators or 
otherwise corrupting the political process in order to obtain new benefits or 
to establish new hurdles for would-be rivals.21 
Although many Americans were impressed by the achievements 
of wealthy businessmen, such as Andrew Carnegie and John D. 
Rockefeller, “[a] great many other Americans, however, became 
alarmed at the spread of cartels, combinations, and apparently 
predatory behavior by firms possessing economic wealth and power 
on a scale undreamt of just a few short decades before.”22 Farmers and 
small businesses felt gouged and economically threatened.23 There 
was growing public concern about anti-competitive behavior and 
political pressure to address it.24 
In the old economy, workers were at a distinct disadvantage 
relative to employers.25 The labor market was not exactly 
competitive.26 In a competitive market, the factors of production earn 
their marginal return.27 In the old economy, monopolistic industries, 
such as Carnegie’s Steel, Rockefeller’s Standard Oil, and Vanderbilt’s 
New York Central Railroad, could exploit workers, paying them less 
than their labor was worth and subjecting them to other harsh terms.28 
No individual worker could bargain with the employer because there 
was no alternative employment and the employer knew that.29 If a 
 
 21. James May, The Story of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, in ANTITRUST 
STORIES 7, 10 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007). 
 22. See id. at 10–11. 
 23. See id. at 11 (describing farmers’ anxiety over the growth of cartels). 
 24. See id. (“Growing public alarm prompted not only new state and federal 
legislative investigations of anticompetitive behavior, but also the passage of state 
antitrust laws beginning in the late 1880’s.”). 
 25. See GREEN, supra note 17, at 3 (“A company town seems necessarily to 
be a place where one business exerts a Big Brother-like grip over the population—
controlling or even taking the place of government . . . .”). 
 26. See id. at 59 (describing the practice of substituting convict labor for 
striking employees). 
 27. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 361 (8th ed. 2010) 
(“If the [competitive] firm is maximizing profits, then the value of the marginal 
product of each factor that it is free to vary must equal its factor price.”). 
 28. See Robert McNamara, Robber Barons, THOUGHTCO, 
thoughtco.com/robber-barons-1773964 [https://perma.cc/NA5M-6PDB] (last 
updated Dec. 27, 2018) (stating that these men built enormous wealth through 
predatory and unfair practices that exploited workers and consumers). 
 29. See ELY, supra note 8, at 111–12 (describing “iron-clad oath[s,]”—
without competition, employers could require these contracts as a condition of 
employment—as agreements not to join a union and creating a system of slavery). 
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worker complained, the worker would be fired.30 The work of a single 
worker was largely irrelevant to the corporation. 
The solution to the plight of the workers was collective 
bargaining.31 Under common law, collective bargaining was illegal.32 
However, as workers accumulated voting rights and political powers, 
laws were passed to permit collective bargaining.33 With collective 
bargaining, the workers banded together to negotiate as a single unit.34 
If acceptable wages and other terms of employment were not offered, 
the union representing the workers and negotiating a collective 
bargaining agreement could call a strike.35 Then all employees would 
cease to work, and the corporation’s business and profits would be 
brought to a halt as long as the union workers could prevent 
replacements from crossing the picket lines.36 This tactic was 
successful in forcing corporations to pay better wages, offer safer 
working conditions, and provide more favorable benefits.37 Unions are 
 
 30. See id. at 110–11 (documenting numerous cases of blacklisting for 
requesting increased wages). 
 31. See id. at 96 (“Trade-unions and labor organizations are, then, designed 
to remove disadvantages under which the great mass of workingmen suffer . . . .”). 
 32. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 
S. Ct. 2448, 2471 n.7 (2018). 
 33. In describing portions of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151–169, Dubofsky and Dulles write, 
It was to be an unfair labor practice for an employer to restrain or coerce his 
employees from exercising their rights, to try to dominate or even contribute 
financially to the support of any labor organization, to encourage or 
discourage union membership by discrimination in hiring and firing, or to 
refuse to bargain collectively. Moreover, representatives designated for 
collective bargaining by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit, 
whether it was an employer, craft, or plant unit, were to have exclusive 
bargaining rights for all employees. 
MELVYN DUBOFSKY & FOSTER RHEA DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA 253 (8th ed. 2010). 
 34. See id. at 258 (“The protection given labor’s right to organize and bargain 
collectively was the most important phase of the prolabor policy that was generally 
followed under the New Deal.”). 
 35. See STIGLITZ, supra note 20, at 455 (“Labor unions are organizations of 
workers, formed to obtain better working conditions and higher wages for their 
members. The main weapon they have is the threat of a collective withdrawal of labor, 
known as a strike.”). 
 36. See id. at 460 (observing that the possibility of replacement workers will 
limit a union’s power). 
 37. See id. at 456 (“[T]he unions were able to obtain for their workers 
substantial wage increases and improvements in working conditions.”). 
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frequently credited with creating weekends and forty-hour work 
weeks.38 
One early economist who was concerned with the plight of labor 
was Richard Ely. Describing some conditions in the nineteenth 
century, Ely wrote, 
The length of a day’s labor varied from twelve to fifteen hours. The New 
England Mills generally ran thirteen hours a day the year round, but one 
mill in Connecticut ran fourteen hours, while the length of actual labor in 
another mill in the same State, the Eagle Mill at Griswold, was fifteen hours 
and ten minutes. The regulations at Paterson, New Jersey, required women 
and children to be at work at half-past four in the morning.39 
Ely went on to describe many other harsh practices.40 For example, 
firms would pay their workers at long intervals, necessitating the use 
of credit to survive between paydays.41 The terms of the credit would 
be oppressive.42 Companies would require workers to use their credit 
in company-owned stores, which charged excessive prices.43 
Companies also would exert control over employees’ political 
choices.44 Ely wrote, “I know a whole town, for example, whose 
inhabitants while free in certain elections, in others are marched like 
sheep to the polls, and ordered to vote in a manner well pleasing to a 
great corporation.”45  
 
 38. See Louis Jacobson, Does the 8-Hour Day and the 40-Hour Week Come 
from Henry Ford, or Labor Unions?, POLITIFACT (Sept. 9, 2015, 3:54 PM), 
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/sep/09/viral-image/does-
8-hour-day-and-40-hour-come-henry-ford-or-lab [http://perma.cc/U537-UDXK] 
(inferring the widely held notion that unions played an integral role in helping to 
codify the forty-hour work week); cf. PAUL LE BLANC, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE U.S. 
WORKING CLASS 47–48 (1999) (“The AFL’s [American Federation of Labor] 
immediate predecessor . . . initiated a nationwide campaign for the eight-hour 
workday.”). 
 39. ELY, supra note 8, at 49. 
 40. See id. (providing some graphic examples of cruel and oppressive 
practices used to curtail employee union involvement). 
 41. See id. at 103. 
 42. See id. (“[D]ebt becomes chronic and the prospect of escape well-nigh 
hopeless.”) (emphasis added). 
 43. See id. at 104 (explaining the use of the truck system which compelled 
employees to shop in stores of the employer’s choosing and observing that the 
employees would be cheated in quantity, quality, and price). 
 44. See id. at 107 (“Employers [we]re able to influence the political and 
religious life of their employees.”). 
 45. Id. at 107–08. 
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One tactic that Ely found particularly oppressive was the practice 
of blacklisting workers.46 According to Ely, 
[a] man who for any reason, be it even whim, caprice, or personal spite, falls 
into disfavor with one employer, is placed on the black list, and his name, 
at times accompanied by a personal description, is sent to allied employers 
all over the country. Thirty-three men were black-listed in Fall River a few 
years ago because they had asked for an increase of wages, and they were 
compelled to seek work under assumed names. It is reported, on apparently 
good authority, that one railway corporation has a book containing names 
of a thousand black-listed persons, with a full description of each. The black 
list will pursue a man for years, will drive him out of an honest trade to rum-
selling, and will follow him across the continent, and everywhere defeat his 
efforts to gain a livelihood.47 
Ely perceived collective bargaining and strike tactics to be a 
useful device for fighting these labor-market conditions that existed in 
the nineteenth century.48 He summarized the conditions of labor in 
three points: 
1. The absence of actual equality between the two parties to the labor-
contract, and the one-sided determination of the price and other conditions 
of labor. 
2. The almost unlimited control of the employer over the social and political 
life, the physical and spiritual existence, and the expenditures of his 
employees.  
3. The uncertainty of existence which, more than actual difference in 
possessions, distinguishes the well-to-do from the poor.49 
Labor unions evolved into important institutions with concentrated 
political and economic power.50 As political theory predicts, 
concentration of power attracts opportunities for corruption.51 Paul 
LeBlanc writes that “the failure to acknowledge and explore the 
existence of corruption will also prevent us from grasping the realities 
 
 46. See id. at 110 (referring to the black-list as one of “two refinements of 
cruelty”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 114–18 (describing “the manner in which trades-unions and 
labor organizations may operate to counteract these economic evils”). 
 49. Id. at 100. 
 50. See DUBOFSKY & DULLES, supra note 33, at 243 (“Never before [the New 
Deal] had as much economic and political power seemed within the reach of organized 
labor.”); id. at 262 (“Government had swung over to the support of the interests of 
labor, and so had the courts.”). 
 51. See Rajeev Goel & Michael Nelson, Corruption and Government Size: A 
Disaggregated Analysis, 97 PUB. CHOICE 107, 107 (1998) (“[O]ur results show that 
government size, in particular spending by state governments, does indeed have a 
strong positive influence on corruption.”). 
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of working-class history.”52 He further discusses corruption that 
occurs when union leaders become distant from the membership and 
work to attain personal benefits.53 Another form of corruption is the 
effort of the unions to appropriate more benefits not from capitalists 
but from other workers that are not members of the union and from 
the general public interest.54 Finally, he observes the reality that labor 
unions attracted significant elements of organized crime.55 
It must be conceded that labor unions played an important 
historical role in fighting unfair employment practices used by 
wealthy and greedy monopolists.56 Concurrently, the methods used by 
unions were not always honorable, and they sometimes worked 
against the public interest.57 As the economy has changed, unions have 
become less relevant in the United States.58 
In the words of Melvyn Dubofsky and Foster Dulles,  
[t]he prospects for the American labor movement at the end of the century 
appeared bleak. Unions again seemed on the defensive, unable to attract 
members in the growth industries, where employers successfully practiced 
human resources management and alternative industrial relations, and 
threatened by job losses in the declining mass-production industries. Once 
again the nation’s rulers in politics and business looked at unions with 
jaundiced eyes and declared that the conditions and fate of workers should 
be left to the marketplace. Labor’s few friends and advocates in office 
seemed unable to advance the interests of workers or to offer more than lip 
service to address their grievances. . . . Unions represented fewer than 8 
percent of private sector employees, and barely over 12 percent of the total 
labor force. The tightening of the labor market, a concomitant decline in 
unemployment, rising real wages and incomes that benefited workers 
 
 52. LE BLANC, supra note 38, at 73. 
 53. See id. (“One form of corruption involves the growing distance between 
leadership and membership in many trade unions, as the leadership ‘machine’ 
becomes increasingly distinct from the membership.”). 
 54. See id. at 74–75 (explaining that unions work to obtain resources for 
exclusive groups, not the entire working class, and often work against the interests of 
others). 
 55. See id. at 75–78 (discussing the history of organized crime and 
racketeering in the labor movement). 
 56. See id. at 110 (“The fact remained that a majority of U.S. workers 
experienced significant gains in their living standards and economic security. In some 
cases unions got them these things. In other cases companies gave them these things 
in order to persuade employees that they didn’t need unions.”). 
 57. See id. at 75 (“A more blatant form of corruption soon developed in some 
sectors of the labor movement. This flowed from the utilization by some unions of 
violence from organized criminals in order to secure advantages . . . .”). 
 58. See DUBOFSKY & DULLES, supra note 33, at 412 (“Overall, however, the 
new unionism appeared to have a dim future.”). 
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clustered at the bottom of the occupation ladder that had marked the last 
years of the twentieth century reversed.59 
One might conclude from this that the modern economy is very 
different from the economy that gave rise to powerful labor unions. 
We now have federal and state governments mandating better working 
conditions,60 safer working conditions,61 maternity and paternity 
leave,62 minimum wages,63 medical insurance,64 and other terms that 
might have required collective bargaining to achieve in the past. We 
have antitrust laws that are enforced by the government to deter 
powerful monopolies, and markets are now more competitive.65 We 
have an interstate highway system, inexpensive cars, mass transit, and 
daily shuttles connecting workers in Boston and Washington with 
New York by air transport.66 We have teleworking through the 
internet.67 Small businesses can set up shop in remote locations and 
compete nationally if they have broadband service, and a push is on to 
 
 59. Id. at 404–05. 
 60. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2018) 
(creating new labor condition requirements); The Playground Equipment Safety Act, 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 408.681–408.687 (2019) (creating—an example of a state labor 
law—labor condition requirements to govern playground equipment installation); see 
also STIGLITZ, supra note 20, at 457 (“One explanation [for the decline in unions] is 
that . . . working conditions for workers have improved enormously. Workers see less 
need for unions.”).  
 61. See STIGLITZ, supra note 20, at 459–60 (“Today, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) attempts to ensure that workers are not exposed 
to unnecessary hazards.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Maryland Healthy Working Families Act, MD. CODE ANN., 
LAB. & EMPL. § 3-1305 (West 2018) (mandating that companies with more than 
fifteen employees working in Maryland provide paid sick leave which can be used for 
maternity or paternity leave). 
 63. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 203 (establishing a minimum 
wage). 
 64. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 
(2018) (penalizing large employers who do not provide an employee group health 
insurance plan). 
 65. See STIGLITZ, supra note 20, at 405 (“Today antitrust laws are on the 
books at both state and federal levels [sic] and are enforced by both criminal and civil 
courts. The government takes action not only to break up existing monopolies but also 
to prevent firms from obtaining excessive market power.”). 
 66. See Mark Potts, Shuttle Shoot-Out: New York Air Zeros In on Eastern’s 
Institution; Bagels and Buses Promotional Weapons in War Over Fares, WASH. POST, 
July 8, 1984, at G1 (describing the history of the New York to Washington shuttle). 
 67. See Faiz Siddiqui, At Metro, No Clear Plan to Win Back Riders, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 1, 2018, at B3 (observing increasing trend toward teleworking). 
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expand coverage.68 Employees have much more mobility, and the 
labor market is much more competitive.69 Employers find it difficult 
to hire skilled workers, and as a result, skilled workers can hold out 
for wages that equal the value of their marginal product.70 Unions are 
less important.71 
II. SOME ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 
A. Theory of the Firm 
It will be useful to review a few basic principles of economics. 
Economics is the study of decision making under conditions of 
scarcity.72 Human wants are assumed to be unlimited in the sense that 
everyone will always prefer more goods to not having more.73 Scarcity 
exists because resources are finite.74 This implies that choosing more 
of one thing necessarily implies having less of some other thing.75 
Economics studies the allocation of resources under conditions of 
scarcity.76 
 
 68. See, e.g., Brian Fung, Cities Given Freer Rein to Run Broadband Service, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2015, at A10 (reporting on FCC action to assist smaller 
communities in providing faster internet service). 
 69. See Thompson, supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 70. See STIGLITZ, supra note 20, at 210–11 (discussing the widening wage 
gap between skilled and unskilled workers). 
 71. See DUBOFSKY & DULLES, supra note 33, at 405 (describing the decline 
of the labor movement and union membership). 
 72. Mark Klock, Contrasting the Art of Economic Science with Pseudo-
Economic Nonsense: The Distinction Between Reasonable Assumptions and 
Ridiculous Assumptions, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 153, 162 (2010) [hereinafter Contrasting 
the Art of Economic Science with Pseudo-Economic Nonsense]. 
 73. See PAUL WONNACOTT & RONALD WONNACOTT, ECONOMICS 27 (3d ed. 
1986) (“Our material wants are virtually unlimited or insatiable.”). 
 74. See Mark Klock, Are Wastefulness and Flamboyance Really Virtues? 
Use and Abuse of Economic Analysis, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 181, 187–88 (2002) (“[I]t is 
an undisputed fact that resources are in fact finite.”). 
 75. See Contrasting the Art of Economic Science with Pseudo-Economic 
Nonsense, supra note 72, at 162 (“Economists are interested in the problem of 
choosing between alternatives—situations in which one must sacrifice one alternative 
in order to consume another alternative.”). 
 76. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 16 (3d ed. 
1984) (“The all-pervasive economic problem is that of scarcity.”). 
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Microeconomics focuses on equilibrium states in particular 
markets.77 Microeconomics has two main branches:78 the theory of the 
firm and consumer theory.79 I will briefly discuss the theory of the firm 
first.  
The first assumption made about firms is that their goal is to 
maximize profits.80 This enables us to express a firm’s objective as a 
mathematical function subject to a constraint and use the tools of 
mathematics to solve the problem.81 All profit-maximizing firms will 
select the level of output for which marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost.82 If marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost then the firm can 
increase profits by increasing output.83 If marginal costs exceed 
marginal revenue then the firm can increase profits by reducing 
output.84 
The performance of the firm will depend on the industry 
structure.85 There are two polar opposite structures as well as the 
continuum in between.86 At one end of the spectrum we have perfectly 
competitive firms.87 The polar opposite structure is monopoly.88 
 
 77. See id. at 19 (“[M]icroeconomics concentrates mainly upon equilibrium 
states of particular markets.”). 
 78. See VARIAN, supra note 27, at xx (“I have followed the standard order of 
discussing first consumer theory and then producer theory . . . .”). 
 79. See R. GLENN HUBBARD & ANTHONY PATRICK O’BRIEN, 
MICROECONOMICS, 16 (4th ed. 2013) (“Microeconomics issues include explaining 
how consumers react to changes in product prices and how firms decide what prices 
to charge for the products they sell.”). 
 80. See VARIAN, supra note 27, at 345 (“[W]e describe a model of how the 
firm chooses the amount to produce and the method of production to employ. The 
model we will use is the model of profit maximization: the firm chooses a production 
plan so as to maximize its profits.”). 
 81. Cf. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 14 (6th ed. 
2012) (“Economics is rife with functions: production functions, utility functions, cost 
functions, social welfare functions, and others. A function is a relationship between 
two sets of numbers such that for each number in one set, there corresponds exactly 
one number in the other set.”). 
 82. See HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 76, at 183 n.6. 
 83. See Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. 
L. REV. 317, 321 (2002) (describing profit maximization as marginal revenue equaling 
marginal cost). 
 84. See id. 
 85. See LYNNE PEPALL ET AL., INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 9 (3d ed. 2005) 
(describing the structure-conduct-performance paradigm). 
 86. See id. at 10 (“[P]erfect competition and monopoly are usefully viewed 
as opposite ends of a spectrum of market structures along which all markets lie.”). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
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With a perfectly competitive industry structure, each firm’s 
output is such a small portion of the industry output that altering the 
firm’s output will have no impact on the price of the commodity.89 In 
this situation, firms behave as price-takers, meaning that they take the 
price as set by the market and something that is beyond their control.90 
In a perfectly competitive industry, not only does marginal revenue 
equal marginal cost for each profit maximizing firm in equilibrium, 
but marginal revenue also equals the price.91  
Perfect competition also benefits workers as much as 
consumers.92 Under perfect competition, each factor of production will 
earn its marginal revenue product.93 This means that workers will be 
paid a wage equal to the value their last unit work contributes.94 
For economists, perfect competition is the gold standard for 
performance.95 This is because perfectly competitive equilibria will be 
Pareto efficient.96 An allocation of resources is said to be Pareto 
efficient if no one can be made better off without making someone 
else worse off.97 An allocation which is not Pareto efficient can be 
characterized as a situation in which resources are being transferred 
using a leaky bucket.98 The wasted leakages represent an inefficiency 
 
 89. See id. at 22 (“Hence, to be a true perfectly competitive firm, the firm’s 
output must not alter the going price.”). 
 90. See id. at 21–22 (“A perfectly competitive firm is a ‘price taker.’ The 
price of its product is not something that the perfectly competitive firm chooses. 
Instead, that price is . . . beyond the influence of any one of the perfectly competitive 
firms.”). 
 91. See id. at 23. 
 92. See id. at 36–37 (explaining that perfect competition maximizes the total 
surplus to consumers and producers). 
 93. See VARIAN, supra note 27, at 422 (“In a long-run equilibrium with zero 
profits, all of the factors of production are being paid their market price . . . .”). 
 94. See id. (explaining that each factor is being paid exactly its market value). 
 95. See PEPALL ET AL., supra note 85, at 34–35 (“[I]t is time to try to 
understand why perfect competition is extolled and pure monopoly is guarded against 
by law.”). 
 96. See Mark Klock, A Raisin in Reserve: Horne, Takings, and the Problem 
of Government Price Supports, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 713, 723 [hereinafter A Raisin 
in Reserve] (“[E]very competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.”). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 
91 (1975) (drawing the analogy of the tradeoff to taking from the rich to give to the 
poor but carrying the money in a leaky bucket; the amount of leakage is the loss in 
efficiency). 
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which, if recovered, could be used to make people better off without 
costing anyone else.99 
There are two fundamental theorems of welfare economics.100 
One is that every perfectly competitive equilibrium is a Pareto 
efficient allocation of resources.101 The second is that every Pareto 
efficient allocation of resources can be achieved by a perfectly 
competitive equilibrium.102 This explains why economists desire 
competitive markets. Concerns about the equity of an allocation of 
resources can be addressed through taxation and redistribution of 
resources as long as care is taken not to use a leaky bucket and create 
Pareto inefficiency.103 
As mentioned, the polar opposite industry structure is monopoly. 
A monopoly is characterized by a single firm in the industry.104 Being 
the only firm in an industry, the monopoly can easily impact the price 
by altering output.105 Like all profit-maximizing firms, a monopolist 
sets marginal revenue equal to marginal cost.106 But unlike a 
competitive firm, price will be greater than the marginal cost.107 The 
result is a Pareto inefficient allocation or a deadweight loss.108 Under 
 
 99. See A Raisin in Reserve, supra note 96, at 743 (“[C]onsumers loose more 
than . . . producers gain.”). 
 100. See id. at 723 (“[T]wo important theorems of welfare economics are first, 
that every competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient, and second, that any Pareto 
efficient allocation can be achieved via a competitive equilibrium.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 101. See RICHARD W. TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE 55 (2d ed. 2002) (“The first 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics states that . . . a perfectly competitive 
market system generates . . . pareto optimality.”). 
 102. See EUGENE SILBERBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMICS: A 
MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS 481 (1978) (“The second ‘theorem’ of classical welfare 
economics is the statement that there is an allocation under perfect competition for 
any overall Pareto optimum.”). 
 103. See STIGLITZ, supra note 20, at 325 (“With appropriate redistributions of 
wealth, the economy can achieve any desired distribution of income.”). 
 104. See id. at 336. 
 105. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 308 (1998) (“The 
key difference between a competitive firm and a monopoly is the monopoly’s ability 
to influence the price of its output.”). 
 106. See WILLIAM S. BROWN, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 291 (1995) 
(explaining that the fundamental rule for profit maximization—producing a quantity 
at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost—is the same for monopolists and 
competitive firms). 
 107. See id. at 292. 
 108. See PEPALL ET AL., supra note 85, at 39 (showing the deadweight loss as 
a measure of inefficiency under monopoly). 
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monopoly, profits will be higher, prices will be higher, and output will 
be lower than is socially optimal.109 
There is a related concept called monopsony. Monopoly 
involves a single seller of a commodity.110 Monopsony involves a 
single purchaser of an input.111 An example is a company town where 
there is only one purchaser of labor.112 Monopsony is considered 
unusual today, but it was more common during the development of the 
American labor movement.113 As explained in one text, 
[w]e know that a firm with a monopoly in an output market takes advantage 
of its market power to reduce the quantity supplied to force up the market 
price and increase its profits. A firm that has a monopsony in a factor market 
would employ a similar strategy: It would restrict the quantity of the factor 
demanded to force down the price of the factor and increase profits. A firm 
with a monopsony in a labor market will hire fewer workers and pay lower 
wages than would be the case in a competitive market. Because fewer 
workers are hired than would be hired in a competitive market, monopsony 
results in a deadweight loss. Monopoly and monopsony have similar effects 
on the economy: In both cases, a firm’s market power results in a lower 
equilibrium quantity, a deadweight loss, and a reduction in economic 
efficiency compared with a competitive market.114 
Situations in between perfect competition and monopoly are 
generally referred to as oligopolies.115 An oligopoly is an industry 
characterized by a small number of large firms.116 Each firm controls 
a sufficiently large portion of output to be able to alter price by 
changing its output.117 Oligopolies still create deadweight losses and 
 
 109. See BROWN, supra note 106, at 295 (monopolies are not efficient because 
they produce less and charge more than competitive firms). 
 110. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 79, at 570 (explaining that 
monopsony is the case where there is only one buyer of a factor of production). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. (providing the example of “a firm in an isolated town . . . that is 
the sole employer of labor in that location”). 
 113. See id. (noting that monopsony is relatively rare, but giving examples of 
monopsony from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See VARIAN, supra note 27, at 497 (explaining that the situation in 
between pure competition and monopoly is oligopoly). 
 116. See id. (“[With oligopoly,] there are a number of competitors in the 
market, but not so many as to regard each of them as having a negligible effect on 
price.”). 
 117. See PEPALL ET AL., supra note 85, at 199 (discussing the fact that an 
oligopolist can impact market price). 
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earn some monopoly profits, though smaller.118 In the late-nineteenth 
century, industries such as steel, oil, and railroad were organized as 
monopolies or oligopolies.119 These firms used strong tactics to exploit 
workers and increase profits.120 
B. Consumer Theory, Public Goods, and Free-Riders 
The dissenting opinion in Janus rests heavily on arguments 
about preventing a problem of free-riders.121 Before explaining the 
free-rider problem, it is useful to summarize a bit of consumer theory. 
Consumers are assumed to be interested in maximizing their own 
objective function.122 This is normally called a utility function.123 
Consumers always have limited resources.124 They cannot have more 
of everything.125 In selecting what they will consume and what they 
will forgo, they make selections such that their marginal utility of 
 
 118. Cf. W. BRUCE ALLEN ET AL., MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 334 (7th ed. 2009) 
(“As a general rule, you[] [would] like to manage as an oligopolist; they realize 
relatively high profits.”). 
 119. See DUBOFSKY & DULLES, supra note 33, at 85–86 (“But the immediate 
driving force of industrial expansion came from a group of visionary, ambitious, and 
ruthless business leaders and financiers: Jay Gould, E. H. Harriman, and James J. Hill 
fashioned an empire of railroads, Andrew Carnegie an empire of steel, John D. 
Rockefeller an empire of oil. The corporation became the accepted form of business 
organization and, under the leadership of such men, mergers and consolidations were 
affecting the further nationalizing of business. Gigantic combinations sprang up in 
scores of industries—in oil, steel, sugar, linseed oil, stoves, and fertilizers. Monopoly 
was the goal of the industrialist, and a complacent government and complacent courts, 
wedded to the economic doctrine of laissez faire, gave free rein to policies that rapidly 
created a concentration of economic wealth and power that the country had never 
known before.”). 
 120. See id. at 85 (calling the industrialists “ruthless”). 
 121. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 
S. Ct. 2448, 2490–91 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining at length the 
economic incentives for public sector employees to free-ride off dues-paying union 
members). 
 122. See VARIAN, supra note 27, at 3 (“People try to choose the best patterns 
of consumption that they can afford.”).  
 123. See id. at 55 (“The preferences of the consumer are the fundamental 
description useful for analyzing choice, and utility is simply a way of describing 
preferences.”). 
 124. See id. at 21 (describing the budget constraint of the consumer). 
 125. See STIGLITZ, supra note 20, at 24 (“Having more of one thing requires 
giving up something else. Scarcity is a basic fact of life.”). 
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commodity is equal to its marginal cost.126 This is analogous to the 
profit maximization problem faced by firms.127 If marginal utility 
exceeds marginal cost, the individual could increase utility by 
consuming more, and if marginal cost exceeds marginal utility, the 
individual could increase utility by consuming less.128 
In a world in which all goods and services are private, this 
behavior by consumers will contribute to economic efficiency.129 
Examples of private goods and services are steaks, apples, haircuts, 
medical procedures, and transportation services.130 However, in the 
real world we have something called public goods.131 Examples of 
public goods are national defense, parks, scenic views, and space 
exploration.132 
Public goods have two closely related characteristics.133 One is 
non-rivalrous consumption, meaning that one individual’s 
consumption of the good does not leave less available for others.134 
The other characteristic is non-excludability.135 This means that once 
the good is provided to one person, there is no effective way of 
preventing others from consuming it.136 The problem created by public 
goods is that the free market will fail.137 Too little of the public good 
 
 126. See VARIAN, supra note 27, at 78 (explaining that the consumer’s 
marginal rate of substitution will equal the price ratio when the consumer is 
optimizing). 
 127. See BROWN, supra note 106, at 278 (1995) (“[F]irms maximize profits by 
producing the quantity where marginal revenue equals marginal cost.”). 
 128. See VARIAN, supra note 27, at 78 (explaining how the consumer can 
improve her position if the relationship between marginal utility and price is not in 
balance). 
 129. See TRESCH, supra note 101, at 55–56 (explaining that if all consumers 
behave this way the resulting allocation will be pareto efficient). 
 130. See id. at 156 (distinguishing private goods from public goods by “some 
person . . . [that] is affected by at least one other person’s consumption (supply) of 
[the] good (factor)”). 
 131. See STIGLITZ, supra note 20, at 157 (describing public goods). 
 132. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 118, at 585 (describing the nature of public 
goods and using national defense as a core example). 
 133. See MUELLER, supra note 11, at 11 (“A pure public good has two salient 
characteristics . . . .”).  
 134. See STIGLITZ, supra note 20, at 157 (“The consumption (or enjoyment) 
of a public good by one individual does not subtract from that of other individuals 
(consumption is accordingly said to be nonrivalrous).”). 
 135. See id. (“Public goods also have the property of nonexcludability . . . .”). 
 136. See id. (“[I]t costs a great deal to exclude any individual from enjoying 
the benefits of a public good.”). 
 137. See id. at 157–59 (explaining that markets will not produce enough public 
goods). 
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will be provided in the sense that everyone will want and be willing to 
pay for more, but no one will want to be the sucker that actually 
pays.138 Everyone will have a strong incentive to let someone else pay 
while consuming the good for free.139 This is known as the free-rider 
problem.140 The solution that economists typically provide for the free-
rider problem is to have the government provide the public good and 
recover the cost of the good through taxes.141 Note, however, that this 
can only partially mitigate the problem as all people will not place the 
same value on the public good.142 To truly solve the problem in the 
sense of providing a Pareto efficient allocation, the government would 
need to know each individual’s willingness to pay for the public 
good.143 However, everyone will have a strong incentive not to reveal 
their true desire for the public good.144 In private markets, consumers 
reveal their preferences through their purchases.145 With public goods, 
there is no revelation of preferences.146 Some people will want less 
money allocated to the good.147 Others will want more money 
allocated to the good.148 There is no market mechanism that 
equilibrates the divergent preferences.149 
 
 138. TRESCH, supra note 101, at 171 (“If someone does play the ‘sucker,’ 
everyone immediately consumes its services as free riders.”). 
 139. See id. (“The strategy of free riding is a viable, and preferred, option.”). 
 140. See STIGLITZ, supra note 20, at 159 (“This is the free-rider aspect of 
public goods; because it is difficult to preclude anyone from using them, those who 
benefit from the goods have an incentive to avoid paying for them.”). 
 141. See TRESCH, supra note 101, at 171 (“[T]he government is forced to 
purchase the good on behalf of society for there to be any hope of achieving the proper 
allocation of resources to the good, and perhaps to have any of the good at all . . . .”).  
 142. See VARIAN, supra note 27, at 694–95 (describing problems that arise 
when individuals place different values on the public good). 
 143. See id. at 711 (“This would be easy if the decision maker knew the utility 
functions. Unfortunately, in any realistic situation, the decision maker won’t know 
this. And, as we’ve seen, the agents may well have an incentive to misrepresent their 
true utility functions.”). 
 144. See TRESCH, supra note 101, at 172 (“[C]onsumers have no more 
incentive to relate their true preferences to the government than they do to the 
marketplace.”). 
 145. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 79, at 157 (“This difficulty does 
not arise with private goods because consumers must reveal their preferences in order 
to purchase private goods.”). 
 146. See id. (stating that one difficulty of public goods is that the individual 
preferences of consumers are not revealed in the market). 
 147. See VARIAN, supra note 27, at 695 (asserting that some citizens might 
want less national defense). 
 148. See id. (asserting that some citizens might want more national defense). 
 149. See id. (“[T]he decentralized market solutions that economists are fond 
of don’t work very well in allocating public goods.”).  
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In the case under analysis, free riding is assumed to come about 
by public employees who do not pay union fees while obtaining a 
benefit from union representation.150 However, it must be recognized 
that the modern union for public-sector workers is very different from 
the traditional union formed to combat exploitation of workers by 
monopolistic tycoons.151 There are no profits in the public sector to 
capture a share of.152 Public-sector unions merely seek to capture more 
tax revenue for an exclusive group—public workers.153 To the extent 
that public-sector unions benefit those they represent, they are 
capturing above market wages, benefits, and conditions by taking 
more from the public purse.154 The real free-rider problem is then those 
taxpayers who free-ride off of the activities of anti-tax groups working 
for more efficient government performance. No individual taxpayer 
receives much benefit from expending resources to fight tax collection 
as any one person’s share of the tax burden is small.  
III. JANUS 
A. Background—Abood, the Case Janus Overruled 
Janus overturns the 1976 decision made in Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education.155 In order to provide some context for Janus, it 
will be useful to review the decision in Abood.156 The Detroit Board of 
Education entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with a union 
that gave the union the exclusive right to represent public teachers in 
 
 150. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 
S. Ct. 2448, 2490 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (observing “the likelihood of free-
riding when fees are absent”). 
 151. See DISALVO, supra note 9, at 17 (“[U]nions representing government 
workers are different from those found in the private sphere.”).  
 152. See id. at 19 (“[B]ecause government doesn’t go out of business, once 
government workers are unionized, they usually stay unionized.”). 
 153. See id. at 22 (“That [public sector unions] benefit government workers 
themselves by transferring resources to them is clear—that’s what unionization is 
designed to do and it would be surprising if it didn’t do it, at least in some measure.”). 
 154. See id. at 21 (“Public sector unions can serve their own interests well but 
often at the cost of the public’s interest in a government that costs less and does 
more.”). 
 155. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486 (majority opinion) (“Abood was wrongly 
decided and is now overruled.”).  
 156. See generally Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), 
overruled by Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (permitting public-sector non-union members to 
be charged union agency fees for specific, administrative purposes but not ideological 
or political purposes). 
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Detroit and contained an agency shop clause which required every 
public teacher that chose not to become a union member to pay a 
service charge equal to the amount of union dues.157 Teachers who did 
not pay were subject to dismissal.158 The plaintiffs objected, alleging 
that the union was involved in ideological activities which they 
objected to and contending that the agency shop clause thereby 
violated their constitutional rights of freedom of speech and freedom 
of association.159 The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.160 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 
agency shop clause could violate the Constitution but that the plaintiffs 
were not entitled to restitution because they did not provide sufficient 
detail about which of the union’s political causes they objected to.161 
The Supreme Court of Michigan declined the appeal.162 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment and 
remanded the case.163 The Court held that the agency shop clause did 
violate the Constitution.164 However, the Court also said that the non-
union member teachers could be assessed a charge for a portion of the 
dues covering elements, such as the costs of representation in 
collective bargaining agreements and administration of arbitration 
proceedings.165 Such compulsory charges by a union engaged in 
political activities are not unconstitutional under Abood.166 But charges 
 
 157. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 211–12. 
 158. See id. at 212. 
 159. See id. at 212–13. 
 160. See id. at 213. 
 161. See id. at 215 (“Although recognizing that such expenditures ‘could 
violate plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights,’ the court read this Court’s 
more recent decisions to require that an employee who seeks to vindicate such rights 
must ‘make known to the union those causes and candidates to which he objects.’ 
Since the complaints had failed to allege that any such notification had been given, 
the court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to restitution of any portion of the 
service charges.” (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 230 N.W.2d 322, 327 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1975))). 
 162. See id. at 216. 
 163. See id. at 242. 
 164. See id. at 235–36 (stating that union expenditures on political and 
ideological activities not pertaining to its collective bargaining responsibilities cannot 
be financed with funds collected from employees who object to those causes). 
 165. See id. at 236 (“There will, of course, be difficult problems in drawing 
lines between collective-bargaining activities, for which contributions may be 
compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining, for which 
such compulsion is prohibited.”). 
 166. See id. 
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that support lobbying and other political activities are 
unconstitutional.167 The Abood Court wrote, 
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds for the 
expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward 
the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as 
collective-bargaining representative. Rather, the Constitution requires only 
that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid 
by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not 
coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental 
employment.168 
Six justices joined in the majority opinion.169 There was no 
dissent, but the three justices that did not join the majority concurred 
in the judgment remanding the case, while expressing the view that 
even the administrative costs of collective bargaining should not be 
imposed on non-union members in the public sector unless the state 
establishes a compelling government interest in requiring employees 
to pay administrative costs associated with collective bargaining by an 
exclusive representative.170 Justice Powell concluded this concurring 
opinion stating, 
I would adhere to established First Amendment principles and require the 
State to come forward and demonstrate, as to each union expenditure for 
which it would exact support from minority employees, that the compelled 
contribution is necessary to serve overriding governmental objectives. This 
placement of the burden of litigation, not the Court’s, gives appropriate 
protection to first Amendment rights without sacrificing ends of 
government that may be deemed important.171 
This provides the background for Janus. 
B. Facts and Prior History 
The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA) permits state 
employees to unionize.172 If a majority of workers in a unit vote in 
favor of a union, that unit becomes the exclusive bargaining 
 
 167. See id. at 234. 
 168. Id. at 235–36. 
 169. See id. at 210, 244; Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, JUSTIA, 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/431/209/ [https://perma.cc/K6M4-
2RDC] (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) (indicating that Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, 
Rehnquist, and Stevens joined in Justice Stewart’s majority opinion). 
 170. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 244–45, 264 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 171. Id. at 264. 
 172. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 
S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018). 
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representative for all employees in the unit regardless of whether they 
join the union.173 Non-members cannot opt out of representation and 
must pay the union an agency fee, which is a percentage of the full 
dues paid by union members.174 The majority summarized this practice 
as follows: 
Under Abood, nonmembers may be charged for the portion of union dues 
attributable to activities that are “germane to [the union’s] duties as 
collective-bargaining representative,” but nonmembers may not be required 
to fund the union’s political and ideological projects. In labor-law parlance, 
the outlays in the first category are known as “chargeable” expenditures, 
while those in the latter are labeled “nonchargeable.”175 
The Governor of Illinois filed an action in federal district court 
against the union (American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees) asking that the law be declared 
unconstitutional.176 The petitioner, Mark Janus, is a child-support 
specialist employed by the Illinois Department of Healthcare and 
Family Services.177 Janus and others moved to intervene in the 
Governor’s action as additional plaintiffs.178  
According to the Court, 
Janus refused to join the Union because he opposes “many of the public 
policy positions that [it] advocates,” including the positions it takes in 
collective bargaining. Janus believes that the Union’s “behavior in 
bargaining does not appreciate the current fiscal crises in Illinois and does 
not reflect his best interests or the interests of Illinois citizens.” Therefore, 
if he had the choice, he “would not pay any fees or otherwise subsidize [the 
Union].”179  
Under the collective bargaining agreement, Janus had to pay the union 
approximately $535 annually.180 
The district court dismissed the Governor’s complaint for lack 
of standing but allowed Janus and other employees to file their own 
complaint to be treated as the original complaint.181 The employees 
clearly had standing as the assessment of agency fees created a clear 
injury.182 Nevertheless, the district granted the Defendant’s motion to 
 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Id. at 2460–61 (citations omitted) (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 235). 
 176. See id. at 2462. 
 177. See id. at 2461. 
 178. See id. at 2462. 
 179. Id. at 2461 (citations omitted). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. at 2462. 
 182. See id. 
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dismiss on the grounds that the claim was foreclosed by Abood.183 In a 
short opinion written by Judge Posner, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit properly noted that it lacked the authority to overturn 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Abood.184 The Petitioners appealed to 
the U.S. Supreme Court asking that Abood be reversed.185 The Court 
granted certiorari and did indeed overturn Abood.186 
C. The Majority Opinion 
1. Holding and Critical Facts 
Justice Alito began the opinion with the following introduction: 
     Under Illinois law, public employees are forced to subsidize a union, 
even if they choose not to join and strongly object to the positions the union 
takes in collective bargaining and related activities. We concluded that this 
arrangement violates the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling 
them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern. 
     We upheld a similar law in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., . . . and we 
recognize the importance of following precedent unless there are strong 
reasons for not doing so. But there are very strong reasons in this case. 
Fundamental free speech rights are at stake. Abood was poorly reasoned. It 
has led to practical problems and abuse. It is inconsistent with other First 
Amendment cases and has been undermined by more recent decisions. 
Developments since Abood was handed down have shed new light on the 
issue of agency fees, and no reliance interests on the part of public-sector 
unions are sufficient to justify the perpetuation of the free speech violations 
that Abood has countenanced for the past 41 years. Abood is therefore 
overruled.187 
There were some facts in Janus that the majority seemed to find 
especially important.188 One is that the designation of a union as the 
sole representative of all employees significantly restricts the rights of 
an employee.189 The employee may not be represented by anyone else 
and cannot even negotiate directly with the employer on her own 
initiative.190 Another factor under the Illinois law is that the designated 
union is granted broad authority on “pay, wages, hours[,] and other 
 
 183. See id. 
 184. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 851 
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conditions of employment.”191 This authority also reaches matters 
under the IPLRA called policy matters which include issues such as 
“merit pay, the size of the work force, layoffs, privatization, promotion 
methods, and non-discrimination policies.”192 According to the 
majority (and not disputed by the dissent), “Illinois law does not 
specify in detail which expenditures are chargeable and which are 
not.”193 The majority wrote, 
As illustrated by the record in this case, unions charge nonmembers, not just 
for the cost of collective bargaining per se, but also for many other 
supposedly connected activities. Here, the nonmembers were told that they 
had to pay for “[l]obbying,” “[s]ocial and recreational activities,” 
“advertising,” “[m]embership meetings and conventions,” and “litigation,” 
as well as other unspecified “[s]ervices” that “may ultimately inure to the 
benefit of the members of the local bargaining unit.” The total chargeable 
amount for nonmembers was 78.06% of full union dues.194  
Unions are required to give nonmembers what is called a Hudson 
notice in order that the employees assessed agency fees may determine 
the propriety of the charges being assessed.195 Nonmember employees 
have the fees deducted from their pay without their consent.196 The 
majority provides examples of the information given in the Hudson 
notice, and it is only a list of total expenses and chargeable expenses 
by broad categories, such as “Salary and Benefits,” “Postage and 
Freight,” “Telephone,” “Office Printing, Supplies, and Advertising,” 
etc.197 The majority asks, “How could any nonmember determine 
whether these numbers are even close to the mark without launching 
a legal challenge and retaining the services of attorneys and 
accountants? Indeed, even with such services, it would be a laborious 
and difficult task to check these figures.”198 
Another important fact for the majority was the plaintiff’s 
concern about the financial condition of Illinois and differences in the 
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 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 2461. 
 194. Id. (citations omitted). 
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fiscal solutions offered by politicians and unions.199 Citing the poor 
condition of Illinois’s financial health, the majority states, 
Illinois, like some other States and a number of counties and cities around 
the country, suffers from severe budget problems. As of 2013, Illinois had 
nearly $160 billion in unfunded pension and retiree healthcare liabilities. 
By 2017, that number had only grown, and the State was grappling with $15 
billion in unpaid bills. We are told that a “quarter of the budget is now 
devoted to paying down” those liabilities. These problems and others led 
Moody’s and S&P to downgrade Illinois’ credit rating to “one step above 
junk”—the “lowest ranking on record for a U.S. state.”200 
The Governor had proposed partially addressing budget problems 
through collective bargaining with the Union “on matters such as 
health-insurance benefits and holiday, overtime, and promotion 
policies.”201 When these suggestions were presented, the Union 
countered with proposals for wage and tax increases.202 This factual 
backdrop appears to have been important in the majority’s recognition 
of the plaintiff’s right to completely disassociate himself from the 
Union.203 
There is another empirical fact that influenced the majority.204 
The majority notes that in twenty-eight states and the federal 
government, agency fees are not permitted, yet public employees in 
those jurisdictions receive exclusive representation by unions.205 This 
is a strong empirical fact that indicates that the free-rider problem, 
whereby public-sector employees can get “benefits” of union 
representation without paying for it, does not threaten the existence of 
the union.206 The majority explains, 
The federal employment experience is illustrative. Under federal law, a 
union chosen by majority vote is designated as the exclusive representative 
of all the employees, but federal law does not permit agency fees. 
Nevertheless, nearly a million federal employees—about 27% of the federal 
work force—are union members. The situation in the Postal Service is 
similar. Although permitted to choose an exclusive representative, Postal 
Service employees are not required to pay an agency fee, and about 400,000 
 
 199. See id. at 2474–76 (discussing the poor financial condition of Illinois, the 
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 200. Id. at 2474–75 (footnotes omitted). 
 201. Id. at 2475. 
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 204. See id. at 2466. 
 205. See id.  
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are union members. Likewise, millions of public employees in the 28 States 
that have laws generally prohibiting agency fees are represented by unions 
that serve as the exclusive representatives of all the employees. Whatever 
may have been the case 41 years ago when Abood was handed down, it is 
now undeniable that “labor peace” can readily be achieved “through means 
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms” than the assessment 
of agency fees.207 
Perhaps it should also be noted that the plaintiff in this case 
objects to the characterization of free-rider.208 “He argues that he is not 
a free-rider on a bus headed for a destination that he wishes to reach 
but is more like a person shanghaied for an unwanted voyage.”209 
However, whether he is or is not shanghaied is not really important to 
the majority.210 
With that background, the majority’s legal analysis can be 
examined.211 There are three major legal issues.212 One is whether the 
IPLRA impinges on public employees’ free speech rights.213 Another 
legal issue is the level of scrutiny to be applied toward any government 
interest in restricting those rights.214 The third is the conditions for 
overturning precedent.215 However, before those issues are discussed, 
the Court did have to address a relatively trivial issue regarding 
jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution.216  
2. Article III Jurisdiction 
The respondents argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction 
because the petitioner “moved to intervene in [the Governor’s] 
jurisdictionally defective lawsuit.”217 The Court explains, 
This argument is clearly wrong. It rests on the faulty premise that petitioner 
intervened in the action brought by the Governor, but that is not what 
happened. The District Court did not grant petitioner’s motion to intervene 
in that lawsuit. Instead, the court essentially treated petitioner’s amended 
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complaint as the operative complaint in a new lawsuit. And when the case 
is viewed in that way, any Article III issue vanishes. As the District Court 
recognized—and as respondents concede—petitioner was injured in fact by 
Illinois’ agency-fee scheme, and his injuries can be redressed by a favorable 
court decision. Therefore, he clearly has Article III standing. It is true that 
the District Court docketed petitioner’s complaint under the number 
originally assigned to the Governor’s complaint, instead of giving it a new 
number of its own. But Article III jurisdiction does not turn on such 
trivialities.218 
The respondents cited only one case to support their 
jurisdictional argument—United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement 
Co. v. McCord.219 “That case concerned a statute permitting creditors 
of a government contractor to bring suit on a bond between 6 and 12 
months after the completion of the work. One creditor filed suit before 
the 6-month starting date, but another intervened within the 6-to-12 
month window.”220 The McCord Court held that the intervention did 
not cure the jurisdictionally deficient original complaint.221 However, 
the Janus majority properly noted that this opinion actually works 
against the respondents because the Court had contemplated the 
possibility of treating an intervention as an original complaint when 
all of the conditions for an original complaint are met, “e.g., filing a 
separate complaint and properly serving the defendants.”222 The Court 
noted that this actually happened in this case so it can properly address 
the merits.223 
The dissent did not expressly concur with this part of the 
opinion.224 However, the dissent was silent on the issue.225 One can 
only conclude that all nine justices agreed on this point.226 
3. Infringing Free Speech 
The next issue addressed by the majority was whether the 
IPLRA interfered with the petitioner’s First Amendment rights.227 
There is really no question that the agency-shop agreement impinges 
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on an individual’s right to freely associate with whomever they 
wish.228 The majority couches this discussion by questioning “whether 
Abood’s holding is consistent with standard First Amendment 
principles.”229 Before writing at length about First Amendment 
principles, the Court cites dicta from several recent cases disparaging 
Abood.230 In Knox v. Service Employees, the Court said Abood’s 
holding is “something of an anomaly.”231 In Harris v. Quinn, the Court 
said Abood’s “analysis is questionable on several grounds.”232 The 
Janus majority writes, “We have therefore refused to extend Abood to 
situations where it does not squarely control, while leaving for another 
day the question whether Abood should be overruled. We now address 
that question.”233 The majority then begins to make its most 
compelling case for overruling Abood.234 
The majority begins this section writing, “The First Amendment, 
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids 
abridgment of the freedom of speech. We have held time and again 
that freedom of speech ‘includes both the right to speak freely and the 
right to refrain from speaking at all.’”235 The justices then cite a 
laundry list of cases supporting free speech rights and quote several 
passages.236 “Freedom of association . . . plainly presupposes a 
freedom not to associate.”237 “[F]orced associations that burden 
protected speech are impermissible.”238 “If there is any fixed star in 
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein.”239  
The majority continues to develop its arguments for overturning 
Abood writing, 
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     Compelling individuals to mouth support for views they find 
objectionable violates that cardinal constitutional command, and in most 
contexts, any such effort would be universally condemned. Suppose, for 
example, that the State of Illinois required all residents to sign a document 
expressing support for a particular set of positions on controversial public 
issues—say, the platform of one of the major political parties. No one, we 
trust, would seriously argue that the First Amendment permits this. 
     Perhaps because such compulsion so plainly violates the Constitution, 
most of our free speech cases have involved restrictions on what can be said, 
rather than laws compelling speech. But measures compelling speech are at 
least as threatening.240 
The majority then discusses positive public policy objectives 
behind free speech, such as promotion of democracy and the search 
for truth.241 “Whenever the Federal Government or a State prevents 
individuals from saying what they think on important matters or 
compels them to voice ideas with which they disagree, it undermines 
these ends.”242 The majority also observes that compelling speech 
forces individuals to betray their true beliefs, and this is demeaning.243  
The majority then discusses the situation where a person is 
compelled to subsidize the speech of others.244 Although it is not 
binding authority, the majority cites the opinion of Thomas 
Jefferson.245 “[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for 
the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhor[s] is sinful 
and tyrannical.”246 The majority again cites both Knox and Harris for 
the proposition that compulsory subsidization of others’ private 
speech interferes with an individual’s free speech rights.247  
The government does have potentially legitimate interests in the 
agency-shop agreement. One cause that is advanced is the promotion 
of “labor peace.”248 The majority observes, 
In Abood, the main defense of the agency-fee arrangement was that it served 
the State’s interest in “labor peace.” By “labor peace,” the Abood Court 
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meant avoidance of the conflict and disruption that it envisioned would 
occur if the employees in a unit were represented by more than one union. 
In such a situation, the Court predicted, “inter-union rivalries” would foster 
“dissension within the work force,” and the employer could face 
“conflicting demands from different unions.” Confusion would ensue if the 
employer entered into and attempted to “enforce two or more agreements 
specifying different terms and conditions of employment.” And a settlement 
with one union would be “subject to attack from [a] rival labor 
organizatio[n].”249 
A second government interest for the agency-shop clause that 
was advanced by the respondents is the elimination of free-riders.250 
Free-riders are the non-members of the union who could otherwise 
benefit from the union’s collective bargaining activities without 
having to pay for them.251 
4. Level of Scrutiny 
Given that agency fees impinge on free speech but that the 
government might have interests in requiring agency fees, the majority 
next begins a discussion of the standard of review to be applied to the 
government interests.252 The possibilities are rational basis, exacting 
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.253 The majority rejects the rational basis 
standard.254 They do not decide the question of whether strict scrutiny 
is required, instead holding that the government’s interests fail under 
even the less rigorous exacting scrutiny standard.255 
The standard of review is critical in constitutional rights cases.256 
The government always or nearly always prevails when rational basis 
scrutiny is applied.257 Rational basis scrutiny means the government 
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must merely have a rational basis for connecting its means to its 
ends.258 For a challenge to a law to prevail under rational basis 
analysis, the challenger must show that either the government’s goal 
is not legitimate or that there is no rational basis between the law and 
the goal.259 At the other extreme, strict scrutiny is often fatal to the 
government.260 Under strict scrutiny, the government must show that 
it has a compelling interest and that the law is narrowly tailored to 
remedy the compelling interests.261 Situations that provide compelling 
interests are typically when a state has passed a law interfering in a 
fundamental right, such as voting, or a law that discriminates against 
a suspect class, such as a racial minority.262 In between, we have 
exacting scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny.263 In this case the regulation 
must be substantially related to an important government interest.264 
The dissent proposes the application of rational basis scrutiny, 
but the majority contends that “[t]his form of minimal scrutiny is 
foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence and we reject it here.”265 
Petitioner Janus argues that the law should be subject to strict scrutiny, 
but the majority finds that it cannot withstand even exacting 
scrutiny.266 The Court notes recent cases, particularly Knox and Harris, 
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that have considered the level of scrutiny to be applied in assessing the 
constitutionality of agency fees.267  
The first of these cases is Knox v. Service Employees 
International Union, Local 1000.268 This case involved compulsory 
subsidies of commercial speech.269 The union permitted nonmembers 
to object to charges just once per year.270 After the union sent out its 
annual Hudson notice and the period for objecting expired, the union 
assessed a temporary increase in fees to support political campaigns 
and later permitted objectors to opt out and request a refund.271 The 
majority held that this behavior could not withstand exacting 
scrutiny.272 Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg concurred in the 
judgment but wrote separately to express the opinion that the majority 
raised questions about prior agency fee jurisprudence, which were not 
necessary to resolve the case.273 Justices Kagan and Breyer dissented, 
arguing that an opt-out provision to request a refund after fees were 
collected did not violate First Amendment rights.274 The Janus Court 
stated, “Under ‘exacting’ scrutiny, we noted, a compelled subsidy 
must ‘serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through 
means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.’”275 
The second case cited by the majority on this point is Harris v. 
Quinn.276 Here a state-run Medicaid program permitted participants to 
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hire a personal assistant.277 Illinois law declared all personal assistants 
in the program to be employees of the State of Illinois solely for the 
purposes of the IPLRA and subject to the agency fee requirement of 
the public employees’ union.278 The majority distinguished these 
personal assistants from full-fledged public employees.279 The 
majority then, without overruling Abood, went to great lengths to 
criticize Abood and declared that it would not expand Abood to cover 
situations where it was not directly controlling.280 The majority then 
declared that the agency fee requirement as applied to physicians’ 
assistants did not pass exacting scrutiny.281 The same group of justices 
that dissented in Janus also dissented in Harris.282 These justices 
expressed some relief that the majority did not overrule Abood, but 
they disagreed with the majority’s dicta undermining Abood.283 They 
further disagreed with the majority’s attempt to differentiate between 
personal assistants working under the state-run Medicaid program and 
what the majority termed “full-fledged public employees.”284 
After citing these cases, the Court decided to revisit Abood and 
apply exacting scrutiny.285 Obviously, the Court could not side with 
the petitioners without overruling Abood so they felt compelled to 
analyze the decision.286 The Court was willing to assume that 
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maintaining peace between the state and its employees is a compelling 
state interest, but the majority wrote, 
Abood cited no evidence that the pandemonium it imagined would result if 
agency fees were not allowed, and it is now clear that Abood’s fears were 
unfounded. The Abood Court assumed that designation of a union as the 
exclusive representative of all the employees in a unit and the exaction of 
agency fees are inextricably linked, but that is simply not true.287 
The Court’s reasoning that agency fees and exclusive 
representation are not linked is based on the fact that in the federal 
government and the twenty-eight states that prohibit agency fees, 
public-sector unions still thrive.288 The Court suggests two possible 
justifications for compelling agency fees for non-members.289 One is 
that unions would not be willing to provide representation without 
agency fees.290 The other is that it would be unfair to require unions to 
represent employees who do not pay agency fees.291 The Court rejects 
both of these as unsound.292  
With respect to the first argument, the Court writes, 
     First, it is simply not true that unions will refuse to serve as the exclusive 
representative of all employees in the unit if they are not given agency fees. 
As noted, unions represent millions of public employees in jurisdictions that 
do not permit agency fees. No union is ever compelled to seek that 
designation. On the contrary, designation as exclusive representative is 
avidly sought. Why is this so? 
     Even without agency fees, designation as the exclusive representative 
confers many benefits. As noted, that status gives the union a privileged 
place in negotiations over wages, benefits, and working conditions. Not 
only is the union given the exclusive right to speak for all the employees in 
collective bargaining, but the employer is required by state law to listen to 
and to bargain in good faith with only that union.293 
The Court also observes in a footnote that unions aggressively 
campaign for the right to represent employees in jurisdictions 
prohibiting agency fees.294 
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As for the second argument, the Court cites many additional 
benefits of a union’s right to exclusively represent public workers.295 
The only duty that the union must provide in exchange is the duty not 
to “act solely in the interests of [the union’s] own members.”296 
According to the Court, “[t]hese benefits greatly outweigh any extra 
burden imposed by the duty of providing fair representation for 
nonmembers.”297  
After concluding that shop-clause agreements do not 
substantially serve an important government interest and agency fees 
cannot be justified to prevent free-riding, the Court discusses 
alternative arguments presented.298 The most significant discussion 
here is about an idea that employers can place some restrictions on 
speech.299 The case cited in support of this proposition is Pickering v. 
Board of Education of Township High School District 205.300 In 
Pickering, a teacher claimed that his constitutional rights were 
violated when he wrote a public letter criticizing the school board 
about school spending decisions.301 Although the Court sided with the 
teacher, it did acknowledge that the state has strong interests in 
regulating the speech of employees as employees which differs from 
regulating the speech of employees as members of the public.302 The 
Court held that a balance must be struck.303 Defenders of agency fees 
would contend that compelling employees to support collective 
bargaining costs balances in favor of the state.304 
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 303. See id. (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the 
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern 
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”). 
 304. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2471. 
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The majority was not impressed with this line of argument.305 
The Court observed, 
As we pointed out in Harris, Abood was not based on Pickering. The Abood 
majority cited the case exactly once—in a footnote—and then merely to 
acknowledge that “there may be limits on the extent to which an employee 
in a sensitive or policymaking position may freely criticize his superiors and 
the policies they espouse.” That aside has no bearing on the agency-fee issue 
here.306 
The Court went on to discuss that even if it were to apply 
Pickering, it would not work in favor of the labor union.307 This is 
because the matters negotiated in collective bargaining involve 
matters that are of clear public concern.308 Issues such as tenure for 
teachers, measurement of student performance, and merit pay over 
seniority are matters taken up in collective bargaining, which 
individuals asserting free speech rights might sincerely desire not to 
support.309 Citing a variety of union positions, the Court observes, 
     Unions can also speak out in collective bargaining on controversial 
subjects such as climate change, the Confederacy, sexual orientation and 
gender identity, evolution, and minority religions. These are sensitive 
political topics, and they are undoubtedly matters of profound “value and 
concern to the public.” We have often recognized that such speech 
“occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values” and 
merits “special protection.” 
     . . . . 
     . . . In short, the union speech at issue in this case is overwhelmingly of 
substantial public concern.310 
 
 305. See id. at 2472. 
 306. Id. (citations omitted). 
 307. See id. at 2474 (“Even if we were to apply some form of Pickering, 
Illinois’[s] agency-fee arrangement would not survive.”). 
 308. See id. at 2477 (“In short, the union speech at issue in this case is 
overwhelmingly of substantial public concern.”). 
 309. See id. at 2475 (“In addition to affecting how public money is spent, 
union speech in collective bargaining addresses many other important matters. As the 
examples offered by respondents’ own amici show, unions express views on a wide 
range of subjects—education, child welfare, healthcare, and minority rights, to name 
a few. What unions have to say on these matters in the context of collective bargaining 
is of great public importance.”) (citations omitted); id. at 2475–76 (continuing with 
the example of educational policies by noting that education is usually the largest 
element of state and local government expenditures). 
 310. Id. at 2476–77 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
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The Court concludes that interference with First Amendment rights 
inflicted by agency fees cannot be justified by the State’s interests.311 
5. Stare Decisis 
The final question to be addressed by the majority is whether 
stare decisis should prevent them from overruling Abood.312 Quoting 
from Payne v. Tennessee, the Court observes, “Stare decisis is the 
preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and 
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial 
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process.”313 The majority states that Court precedent can only 
be changed when there are strong reasons to do so and that stare decisis 
is “not an inexorable command.”314 The Court writes, 
     The doctrine “is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution 
because our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment 
or by overruling our prior decisions.” And stare decisis applies with perhaps 
least force of all to decisions that wrongly denied First Amendment rights: 
“This Court has not hesitated to overrule decisions offensive to the First 
Amendment (a fixed star in our constitutional constellation, if there is one).” 
     Our cases identify factors that should be taken into account in deciding 
whether to overrule a past decision. Five of these are most important here: 
the quality of Abood’s reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, 
its consistency with other related decisions, developments since the decision 
was handed down, and reliance on the decision. After analyzing these 
factors, we conclude that stare decisis does not require us to retain Abood.315 
The Court then began with a discussion about the quality of the 
reasoning in Abood.316 Much of the majority’s opinion parallels the 
majority opinion in the 2014 case of Harris.317 In Harris, the majority 
interpreted the Abood Court as having thought itself bound by two 
prior cases—Railway Employees v. Hanson and Machinists v. 
 
 311. See id. at 2478 (“[W]e conclude that public-sector agency-shop 
arrangements violate the First Amendment, and Abood erred in concluding 
otherwise.”). 
 312. See id. (“There remains the question whether stare decisis nonetheless 
counsels against overruling Abood.”). 
 313. Id. (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)). 
 314. Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009)). 
 315. Id. at 2478–79 (citations omitted). 
 316. See id. at 2479. 
 317. See id. (“We will summarize, but not repeat, Harris’s lengthy discussion 
of the issue.”). 
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Street.318 Hanson had upheld a provision in the Railway Labor Act 
(RLA) that permitted a private union to negotiate a union-shop 
agreement requiring all employees of the private enterprise to join the 
union.319 There was no real First Amendment issue in Hanson; 
however, the employees made a “facial constitutional challenge” 
claiming a “union shop agreement forces men into ideological and 
political associations which violate their right to freedom of 
conscience, freedom of association, and freedom of thought protected 
by the Bill of Rights.”320  
The Harris majority contended that Hanson’s First Amendment 
analysis was inadequate because it dismissed the employees’ 
argument with a single sentence.321 That sentence read, “On the present 
record, there is no more an infringement or impairment of First 
Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by 
state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar.”322 According 
to the majority in Harris, 
     [t]his explanation was remarkable for two reasons. First, the Court had 
never previously held that compulsory membership in and the payment of 
dues to an integrated bar was constitutional, and the constitutionality of such 
a requirement was hardly a foregone conclusion. Indeed, that issue did not 
reach the Court until five years later, and it produced a plurality opinion and 
four separate writings.  
     Second, in his Lathrop dissent, Justice Douglas, the author of Hanson, 
came to the conclusion that the First Amendment did not permit compulsory 
membership in an integrated bar.323 
In Street, the second case which the Abood Court relied on, the 
Court found it unnecessary to address constitutional questions.324 
Instead, the Court interpreted the RLA “as not vesting the unions with 
 
 318. See id. (“Abood went wrong at the start when it concluded that two prior 
decisions, [Hanson and Street,] ‘appear[ed] to require validation of the agency-shop 
agreement before [the Court].’” (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 
226 (1977))). 
 319. See id. (“In Hanson, the primary questions were whether Congress 
exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause or violated substantive due process 
by authorizing private union-shop arrangements under the Commerce and Due 
Process Clauses.” (citing Railway Emps. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233–35 
(1956))). 
 320. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 236. 
 321. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2014). 
 322. Id. (quoting Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238). 
 323. Id. (citations omitted). 
 324. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479 (“For its part, Street was decided as a matter 
of statutory construction, and so did not reach any constitutional issue.” (quoting Int’l 
Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749–50, 768–69 (1961))). 
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unlimited power to spend exacted money.”325 The Street Court stated 
that the RLA “is to be construed to deny the unions, over an 
employee’s objection, the power to use his exacted funds to support 
political causes which he opposes.”326 The Harris majority 
summarized its criticism of the Abood Court’s reasoning in the 
following paragraph: 
The Abood Court seriously erred in treating Hanson and Street as having all 
but decided the constitutionality of compulsory payments to a public-sector 
union. As we have explained, Street was not a constitutional decision at all, 
and Hanson disposed of the critical question in a single, unsupported 
sentence that its author essentially abandoned a few years later. Surely a 
First Amendment issue of this importance deserved better treatment.327 
The majority believes that there is a difference between a union-
shop agreement in the private sector and one in the public sector.328 
The majority continues their criticism of Abood, noting that it did not 
anticipate the conceptual difficulty of separating and adequately 
reporting chargeable and nonchargeable expenses.329 Perhaps most 
importantly to the majority is that “a critical pillar of the Abood 
Court’s analysis rests on an unsupported empirical assumption, 
namely, that the principle of exclusive representation in the public 
sector is dependent on a union or agency shop. As we will explain . . . 
this assumption is unwarranted.”330 
The Janus majority summarizes without fully repeating the 
lengthy discussion in Harris.331 The Janus majority does provide 
additional, lengthy discussion of the empirical fact that agency fees 
are not required and are not manageable.332 The Court concludes that 
there are good reasons to overturn Abood, calling the case an 
“anomaly” in First Amendment jurisprudence.333 The Court juxtaposes 
 
 325. Street, 367 U.S. at 768. 
 326. Id. at 768–69. 
 327. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632. 
 328. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2483 (“It is also significant that the Court decided 
Abood against a very different legal and economic backdrop. Public-sector unionism 
was a relatively new phenomenon in 1977.”). 
 329. See id. at 2480 (“Abood does not seem to have anticipated the magnitude 
of the practical administrative problems that would result in attempting to classify 
public-sector union expenditures as either ‘chargeable’ . . . or nonchargeable.” 
(quoting Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632)). 
 330. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2634. 
 331. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479. 
 332. See id. at 2480. 
 333. Id. at 2483–84. 
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Abood with cases outlawing requirements to compel public employees 
to join a political party.334 The Court states,  
It is an odd feature of our First Amendment cases that political patronage 
has been deemed largely unconstitutional, while forced subsidization of 
union speech (which has no such pedigree) has been largely 
permitted. . . . By overruling Abood, we end the oddity of privileging 
compelled union support over compelled party support and bring a measure 
of greater coherence to our First Amendment law.335 
Next, the majority discusses whether other arguments for 
reliance on precedent could be a sufficient basis for upholding 
Abood.336 In the view of the majority, there are several reasons that it 
does not. One argument advanced by the dissent is that many contracts 
were negotiated with agency fees in place.337 To this the majority 
states, “[I]t would be unconscionable to permit free speech rights to 
be abridged in perpetuity in order to preserve contract provisions that 
will expire on their own in a few years’ time.”338 
The Court also contends that Abood’s distinction between 
chargeable and non-chargeable expenses does not provide a clear 
standard, “so arguments for reliance based on its clarity are 
misplaced.”339 Additionally, the Court contends that “public-sector 
unions have been on notice for years regarding this Court’s misgivings 
about Abood.”340 The idea that economic actors should anticipate 
Supreme Court decisions overturning Court precedent is a weak one, 
but the Court does provide some mitigation against this criticism by 
pointing out that in this case the union contract contained the typical 
severability clause so that entire contracts are not voided by this 
decision.341 
The Court concludes this line of argument: 
     We recognize that the loss of payments from nonmembers may cause 
unions to experience unpleasant transition costs in the short term, and may 
require unions to make adjustments in order to attract and retain members. 
But we must weigh these disadvantages against the considerable windfall 
that unions have received under Abood for the past 41 years. It is hard to 
 
 334. See id. at 2484. 
 335. Id. 
 336. See id. (“In some cases, reliance provides a strong reason for adhering to 
established law . . . .”). 
 337. See id. 2499 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The Court today wreaks havoc on 
entrenched legislative and contractual arrangements.”). 
 338. Id. at 2484 (majority opinion). 
 339. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 (2018)). 
 340. Id. 
 341. See id. at 2485. 
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estimate how many billions of dollars have been taken from nonmembers 
and transferred to public-sector unions in violation of the First Amendment. 
Those unconstitutional exactions cannot be allowed to continue 
indefinitely. 
     All these reasons—that Abood’s proponents have abandoned its 
reasoning, that the precedent has proved unworkable, that it conflicts with 
other First Amendment decisions, and that subsequent developments have 
eroded its underpinnings—provide the “special justification[s]” for 
overruling Abood.342 
D. The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion was very harsh, writing, “[M]aybe most 
alarming, the majority has chosen the winners by turning the First 
Amendment into a sword, and using it against workaday economic and 
regulatory policy.”343 The dissent expressed polar opposite views on 
Abood.344 Their strongest argument is stare decisis, and they pitch it at 
the ending of their introduction: 
Rarely if ever has the Court overruled a decision—let alone one of this 
import—with so little regard for the usual principles of stare decisis. There 
are no special justifications for reversing Abood. It has proved workable. 
No recent developments have eroded its underpinnings. And it is deeply 
entrenched, in both the law and the real world. More than 20 States have 
statutory schemes built on the decision. Those laws underpin thousands of 
ongoing contracts involving millions of employees. Reliance interests do 
not come any stronger than those surrounding Abood. And likewise, judicial 
disruption does not get any greater than what the Court does today.345 
One major difference between the majority and the dissenters is 
that the majority casts the case as one of interference in individuals’ 
private rights of free speech in matters of public concern whereas the 
dissent casts the case as one of the government regulating employees’ 
free speech “in aid of managing its workforce to effectively provide 
public services.”346 The dissent argued that Abood struck a stable 
balance between these conflicting rights.347 “Far from an ‘anomaly,’ 
 
 342. Id. at 2485–86. 
 343. Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 344. See id. at 2487–88 (disagreeing with the entirety of the majority opinion). 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 2497. Compare id. at 2477 (majority opinion) (“In short, the union 
speech at issue in this case is overwhelmingly of substantial public concern.”), with 
id. at 2498 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Abood coheres with the Pickering approach to 
reviewing regulation of public employees’ speech.”). 
 347. See id. at 2487.  
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the Abood regime was a paradigmatic example of how the government 
can regulate speech in its capacity as an employer.”348  
The dissent takes strong exception to the majority’s contention 
that Abood was poorly reasoned.349 The dissent bases its constitutional 
analysis of Abood on three initial points: 
First, exclusive representation arrangements benefit some government 
entities because they can facilitate stable labor relations. In particular, such 
arrangements eliminate the potential for inter-union conflict and streamline 
the process of negotiating terms of employment. Second, the government 
may be unable to avail itself of those benefits unless the single union has a 
secure source of funding. The various tasks involved in representing 
employees cost money; if the union doesn’t have enough, it can’t be an 
effective employee representative and bargaining partner. And third agency 
fees are often needed to ensure such stable funding. That is because without 
those fees, employees have every incentive to free ride on the union dues 
paid by others.350 
According to the dissent, the majority hangs everything on the 
third point.351 The dissent observes authoritatively that the majority 
does not take issue with the first point.352 They also cite support in the 
majority opinion that the majority is willing to assume the second 
point for argument’s sake.353 Interestingly, the dissent does not dispute 
the majority’s empirical observation that agency fees are not required 
to maintain effective exclusive representation.354 Instead, it appears 
that the dissent believed the law should stand if it is reasonable for the 
government to believe that agency fees are necessary to maintain a 
single-labor representative for public employees.355 The dissent writes,  
But basic economic theory shows why a government would think that 
agency fees are necessary for exclusive representation to work. What ties 
the two together, as Abood recognized, is the likelihood of free-riding when 
fees are absent. Remember that once a union achieves exclusive-
representation status, the law compels it to fairly represent all workers in 
the bargaining unit, whether or not they join or contribute to the union. 
Because of that legal duty, the union cannot give special advantages to its 
own members. And that in turn creates a collective action problem of 
 
 348. Id. 
 349. See id. at 2489 (“Unlike the majority, I see nothing ‘questionable’ about 
Abood’s analysis.”). 
 350. Id. (citations omitted). 
 351. See id. at 2489–90 (“So the majority stakes everything on the third 
point—the conclusion that maintaining an effective system of exclusive 
representation often entails agency fees.”). 
 352. See id. at 2489. 
 353. See id. 
 354. See id. at 2480 (majority opinion). 
 355. See id. at 2487–502 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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nightmarish proportions. Everyone—not just those who oppose the union, 
but also those who back it—has an economic incentive to withhold duties; 
only altruism or loyalty—as against financial self-interest—can explain 
why an employee would pay the union for its services. And so emerged 
Abood’s rule allowing fair-share agreements. That rule ensured that a union 
would receive sufficient funds, despite its legally imposed disability, to 
effectively carry out its duties as exclusive representative of the 
government’s employees.356 
This analysis appears to be a concession that the IPLRA can only 
survive under rational-basis scrutiny because the dissent is arguing 
that it is only the government’s reasonable belief that matters, not 
empirical evidence. Under exacting scrutiny, the law must have a 
substantial relation to an important interest.357 If empirical evidence 
demonstrates that agency fees are not necessary, the substantial 
relationship is broken.358 
The dissent places much weight on what it calls “Abood’s 
economic insight.”359 The dissent argues that without agency fees, 
unions will not want to provide effective representation due to the 
free-riding of non-members.360 To this point the dissent writes, 
[T]he majority again fails to reckon with how economically rational actors 
behave—in public as well as private workplaces. Without a fair-share 
agreement, the class of union non-members spirals upward. Employees 
(including those who love the union) realize that they can get the same 
benefits even if they let their memberships expire. And as more and more 
stop paying dues, those left must take up the financial slack (and anyway, 
begin to feel like suckers)—so they too quit the union. And when the vicious 
cycle finally ends, chances are that the union will lack the resources to 
effectively perform the responsibilities of an exclusive representative—or, 
in the worst case, to perform them at all. The result is to frustrate the 
interests of every government entity that thinks a strong exclusive-
representation scheme will promote stable labor relations.361 
In the eyes of the dissent, the theoretical possibility that free-
riding will frustrate the government’s interest in having employees 
effectively represented by a single negotiator is a sufficient interest to 
impose some First Amendment infringement.362 The dissent then turns 
 
 356. Id. at 2490. 
 357. See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2283 
(“[M]easures burdening the freedom of speech or association must serve a compelling 
interest and must not be significantly broader than necessary to serve that interest.”). 
 358. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2467–69. 
 359. Id. at 2448.  
 360. See id. at 2490 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 361. Id. at 2491 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 362. See id. 
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to minimizing that level of infringement.363 The dissent argues that 
compelled speech does not necessarily create greater harm than 
restricted speech.364 They observe that the majority cites only one case 
in support of this proposition and that it is “possibly (thankfully) the 
most exceptional in our First Amendment annals: It involved the state 
forcing children to swear an oath contrary to their religious beliefs.”365 
The dissent argues that the standard rule is that there should be no 
significance to the difference between compelled speech and 
compelled silence.366 They write, 
So when a government mandates a speech subsidy from a public 
employee—here, we might think of it as levying a tax to support collective 
bargaining—it should get at least as much deference as when it restricts the 
employee’s speech. As this case shows, the former may advance a 
managerial interest as well as the latter—in which case the government’s 
“freer hand” in dealing with its employees should apply with equal (if not 
greater) force.367 
The dissent advocates for a much more deferential treatment 
toward the government’s interest in regulating speech of employees.368 
The dissent cites Pickering for the proposition that a public employer 
can curtail employees’ expressions.369 The dissent asserts there must 
be a balance, “enabling the government to curb speech when—but 
only when—the regulation was designed to protect its managerial 
interests.”370 
Having made their arguments that Abood was neither wrongly 
decided nor poorly reasoned, the dissenting justices made an 
independent argument that stare decisis should control.371 Justice 
Kagan writes, 
Abood is not just any precedent: It is embedded in the law (not to mention, 
as I’ll later address, in the world) in a way not many decisions are. Over 
four decades, this Court has cited Abood favorably many times, and has 
affirmed and applied its central distinction between the costs of collective 
 
 363. See id. at 2494. 
 364. See id. (“[T]he majority’s distinction between compelling and restricting 
speech also lacks force.”). 
 365. Id. 
 366. See id. 
 367. Id. at 2495. 
 368. See id. at 2492–97. 
 369. See id. (“The [Pickering] Court could not have cared less whether the 
speech at issue was ‘important.’ It instead asked the speech was truly of the 
workplace—addressed to it, made in it, and (most of all) about it.”) (citation omitted). 
 370. Id. at 2493. 
 371. See id. at 2495. 
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bargaining (which the government can charge to all employees) and those 
of political activities (which it cannot).372 
The dissent also takes exception to the Court’s characterization 
of Abood as “an outlier among our First Amendment cases.”373 Justice 
Kagan asserts that that claim fails and accuses the Court of waging a 
six-year campaign to overturn Abood.374 In particularly harsh language 
she writes, 
Dicta in those recent decisions indeed began the assault on Abood that has 
culminated today. But neither actually addressed the extent to which a 
public employer may regulate its own employees’ speech. Relying on them 
is bootstrapping—and mocking stare decisis. Don’t like a decision? Just 
throw some gratuitous criticisms into a couple of opinions and a few years 
later point to them as “special justifications.”375 
The dissent continues with a discussion of the Court’s 
questioning the workability of Abood.376 Conceding that the line-
drawing between a union’s political activities and collective-
bargaining activities is not crystal clear, she asserts that “as exercises 
of constitutional linedrawing go, Abood stands well above average.”377 
She also notes that there has been tranquility with respect to this issue 
because few cases have been brought challenging the line-drawing.378 
But the majority countered this noting that due to the difficulty in 
unravelling Hudson notices, “it is hardly surprising that chargeability 
issues have not arisen in many Court of Appeals cases.”379 
The dissent concludes with accusations that the Court has 
weaponized the First Amendment and trivialized stare decisis.380  
 
 372. Id. at 2497. 
 373. Id. at 2482 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2491 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(“In many cases over many decades, this Court has addressed how the First 
Amendment applies when the government, acting not as sovereign but as employer, 
limits its worker’s speech. . . . Abood fits neatly with that caselaw, in both reasoning 
and result.”). 
 374. See id. at 2498 (“That claim fails most spectacularly . . . .”); id. at 2487 
(“Today, the Court succeeds in its 6-year campaign to reverse Abood.”). 
 375. Id. at 2498. 
 376. See id. 
 377. See id. 
 378. See id. 
 379. See id. at 2482 n.26 (majority opinion).  
 380. See id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
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IV. PUBLIC CHOICE AND ANALYSIS 
A. Public Choice 
Two important fields of economics relating to law and policy 
analysis are public finance and public choice. Public finance, also 
known as public sector economics, deals with government 
intervention in the economy under conditions of market failure.381 It 
assumes the existence of a benevolent and idealistic entity 
intervening.382 Public choice, on the other hand, is simply the 
application of economic analysis to political science.383 Public choice 
has some relevant insights for Janus, so I will provide a little 
background. 
A good summary is provided by Professor Richard Tresch: 
[James] Buchanan described the foundations of the public choice 
perspective in his Nobel lecture delivered in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1986. 
The disagreements with the mainstream view begin at the most basic level, 
with the assumptions about how people behave. According to Buchanan, 
the mainstream theory assumes that people are essentially schizophrenic. 
They are self-interested in their economic lives, but when they turn to the 
government in their political lives they suddenly become other-interested 
and consider the broader social or public interest in efficiency and equity. 
Nonsense, say the public choice advocates. People do not change their 
stripes; they remain self-interested in their political lives as well. They turn 
to government only because they cannot get what they want for themselves 
in the marketplace, and they view the government as just another venue for 
seeking their own objectives. Buchanan refers to individuals’ interactions 
with the government as fiscal exchanges, to mirror the self-interested 
motivations of standard market exchanges. Using the government in the 
pursuit of self-interest is seen as entirely appropriate and legitimate.384 
In the view of a leading public choice scholar, Dennis Mueller, 
the difference between public finance and public choice is that the 
literature of the first pertains to how governments should behave in a 
world of nirvana and the later literature deals with how governments 
 
 381. See TRESCH, supra note 101, at 8 (“Government activity gains its 
legitimacy through market failure.”). 
 382. See id. at 12 (“The government is not supposed to have a will of its own, 
in the sense that government officials are not permitted to interject their own 
preferences into the design of policy. Instead, the proper role of the government is that 
of an agent acting on behalf of the citizens.”). 
 383. See MUELLER, supra note 11, at 1 (“Public choice can be defined as the 
economic study of nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of 
economics to political science.”). 
 384. TRESCH, supra note 101, at 26 (footnote omitted). 
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actually behave.385 In the real world, special interest groups and 
politically powerful interests exploit the government to capture 
resources for themselves.386 A paper supporting this reality was written 
by another Nobel Laureate while working as the chief economist at 
the World Bank.387 Joseph Stiglitz observed that policy changes that 
would improve efficiency frequently could not get negotiated because 
government officials acted in their self-interest rather than the public 
interest.388 
One of the important insights that comes out of public choice is 
that well-defined constituencies with common interests are more 
easily able to utilize the government to work for their interests or 
capture benefits.389 There is an implicit free-rider problem in 
organizing a large group to defend itself against a concentrated 
interest.390 For example, gun owners are a self-selecting group who are 
highly motivated to maintain their ownership of guns. Non-gun 
owners are clearly a less cohesive group. Although a majority of them 
might favor more regulations pertaining to guns, they will not be 
motivated and incentivized to expend their own resources organizing 
an effective opposition to gun owners. Another example frequently 
 
 385. See MUELLER, supra note 11, at 4 (“[T]he economics literature has often 
made the implicit assumptions that these [market] failures could be corrected at zero 
cost. The government is seen as an omniscient and benevolent institution dictating 
taxes, subsidies, and quantities so as to achieve a Pareto-optimal allocation of 
resources. In the sixties, a large segment of the public choice literature began to 
challenge this ‘nirvana model’ of government. This literature examines not how 
governments may or ought to behave, but how they do behave. It reveals that 
governments, too, can fail in certain ways.”). 
 386. See id. at 62 (“There are many forms of redistribution in the industrial 
democracies that benefit middle and upper income groups, and are difficult to 
reconcile with the various voluntary-redistribution hypotheses discussed . . . , so 
many in fact that some scholars regard all government activity as selfishly and 
redistributively motivated . . . .”). 
 387. See Joseph Stiglitz, Distinguished Lecture on Economics: The Private 
Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (1998). 
 388. See id. at 21 (“In this lecture, I have stressed the difficulties of achieving 
Pareto improvements. What I have really shown is how hard it is to construct these 
Pareto improvements amidst the problems of commitment and the dynamic 
bargaining games that characterize the political process.”). 
 389. See MUELLER, supra note 11, at 347 (“The legislature takes from those 
who are least capable of resisting the demands for wealth transfers and gives to those 
who are best organized for pressing their demands.”). 
 390. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1971) (“[U]nless the number of individuals in a group 
is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make 
individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not 
act to achieve their common or group interests.”). 
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given in the public choice is the capture theory, where government 
regulators are captured by the powerful industries they attempt to 
regulate in order to benefit the industry over the public.391 In another 
paper, I referred to the Food and Drug Administration as “Apologists 
for Carcinogens, Teratogens, and Adulterated Drugs.”392 In yet 
another, I discuss how agricultural interests organize to create price 
supports at a great cost to consumers.393 
The relevance of public choice to Janus should be apparent. 
Unionized public sector employees are clearly a highly cohesive 
interest group.394 Their self-interest is in obtaining better than market 
wages, health insurance, pensions, leave, and every other type of 
compensation.395 They differ from private sector unions in many ways, 
but one important difference is that they get “two bites at the apple.”396 
They can negotiate with their employer through collective bargaining, 
but they can also exert influence on their employer through the 
political process.397 Furthermore, their employer is not under the same 
economic pressure that private employers are.398 Private employers 
must make a profit or go out of business and are at increased risk 
during economic downturns.399 Public employers have access to tax 
 
 391. See Mark Klock, Dead Hands—Poison Catalyst or Strength-Enhancing 
Megavitamin? An Analysis of the Benefits of Managerial Protection and the 
Detriments of Judicial Interference, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 67, 126 (2001) (“The 
capture theory of regulation posits that the regulated have the incentives and ability to 
capture control of the regulator and use the regulator to protect them.”). 
 392. Mark Klock, A Modest Proposal to Rename the FDA: Apologists for 
Carcinogens, Teratogens, and Adulterated Drugs, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1161, 1161 
(2004). 
 393. See A Raisin in Reserve, supra note 96, at 754 (“Agricultural interests, 
seeking to obtain prices above the free market level for their produce, spend resources 
to obtain government subsidies or price supports and collect monopoly rents.”). 
 394. See DISALVO, supra note 9, at 5 (suggesting that organizing tenured 
government employees into interest groups makes it difficult to maintain fiscal 
integrity). 
 395. See FACTOR, supra note 10, at 4–5 (discussing reports that federal 
government workers are overcompensated relative to private sector peers). 
 396. DISALVO, supra note 9, at 20 (“[P]ublic sector unions get to collectively 
bargain with their employers (the first bite) and then they get to influence those on the 
other side of the bargaining table through electioneering and lobbying (the second 
bite).”). 
 397. See id. at 21 (“Public sector unions . . . can win things at the bargaining 
table through political activity.”). 
 398. See id. at 186 (discussing the fact that continued existence in the private 
sector is constantly threatened by competition). 
 399. See id.  
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revenue and inexpensive credit markets.400 All of this makes it difficult 
for the public to defend itself against public sector employee unions. 
One commentator observes, “These unions are cynical exploiters of 
the taxpayer buck for their own advantage. When these unions win, all 
taxpayers lose—including members of private sector unions, who 
suffer higher taxes along with the rest of us when government 
grows.”401 
B. Commentary and Analysis 
In another paper, I wrote that in introductory economics students 
are taught that there are no free lunches, everything involves a cost—
a sacrifice of an alternative choice.402 But I also wrote that in advanced 
economics we teach that free-rides are abundant.403 These are not 
inconsistent. What happens in the case of free-riding is that the cost is 
borne by someone else. Nevertheless, just because free-riding can 
create problems that are difficult for laissez-fair markets to solve, we 
do not necessarily improve social welfare by devising methods to 
prohibit all free-riding. If Canadians feel safer because of the nuclear 
deterrence capabilities of the United States, what is the harm in that?  
If overcoming free-riders to promote labor peace is sufficient 
grounds to compel public employees to subsidize unions, then the 
government could compel senior citizens to join the American 
Association of Retired People to promote peace with seniors.404 And it 
could compel gun owners to join the National Rifle Association to 
promote peace with the gun owning citizenry.405 It does not seem that 
 
 400. See id. at 17 (“Another difference [between public and private sector 
unions] is that governments are able to borrow more cheaply—think of tax-free 
municipal bonds—and can access new revenue through taxation.”). 
 401. FACTOR, supra note 10, at xii. 
 402. See Mark Klock, The Virtue of Home Ownership and the Vice of Poorly 
Secured Lending: The Great Financial Crisis of 2008 as an Unintended Consequence 
of Warm-Hearted and Bond-Headed Ideas, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 135, 136 (2013).  
 403. See id. 
 404. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 
S. Ct. 2448, 2466 (2018) (“Suppose that a particular group lobbies or speaks out on 
behalf of what it thinks are the needs of senior citizens or veterans or physicians, to 
take just a few examples. Could the government require that all seniors, veterans, or 
doctors pay for that service even if they object?”). 
 405. See id. at 2467 (“In simple terms, the First Amendment does not permit 
the government to compel a person to pay for another party’s speech just because the 
government thinks that the speech furthers the interests of the person who does not 
want to pay.”). 
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preventing free-riding in and of itself is a sufficient justification for 
interference with First Amendment rights—there must be more.406 
At the time of the Abood decision, there were two alternative, 
possible results. The Court could have permitted the union to continue 
to assess full union dues to nonmembers, or the Court could have 
prohibited all assessments against nonmembers. The Court did neither 
of these and adopted an intermediate approach attempting to draw a 
line between costs of collective bargaining and costs of political 
activity.407 The fact that the Abood Court rejected the union position 
clearly indicates that a First Amendment problem exists with 
compelling individuals to pay an association that they do not wish to 
associate with.408 So the relevant question is whether or not the Court’s 
line-drawing was sufficient to overcome the constitutional issue. 
The answer to this question turns on the level of scrutiny 
applicable—rational basis or exacting scrutiny. But the Abood Court 
did not consider this question, having concluded that such an inquiry 
was unnecessary based on the rulings in Hanson and Street.409 In a 
lengthy concurring opinion written by Justice Powell and joined by 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, it was stated, “[T]he Court 
avoids such an inquiry on the ground that it is foreclosed by this 
Court’s decisions in [Hanson and Street]. With all respect, the Court’s 
reliance on these cases, which concerned only congressional 
authorization of unionshop agreements in the private sector, is 
misplaced.”410 This concurring opinion proceeds to argue that there 
should be a high level of scrutiny in authorizing agency fees.411 It 
should be so high that “the State should bear the burden of proving 
that any union dues or fees that it requires of nonunion employees are 
needed to serve paramount governmental interests.”412 Justice Powell 
 
 406. See id. (stating that merely benefiting from a group’s action does justify 
the government compelling people to join the group). 
 407. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) (“There 
will, of course, be difficult problems in drawing lines between collective-bargaining 
activities, for which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities 
unrelated to collective bargaining, for which such compulsion is prohibited.”). 
 408. See id. at 235–36 (stating that the Constitution prohibits financing 
political activities with funds compelled or coerced from objecting employees). 
 409. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2631 (2014) (“This [Abood] Court 
treated the First Amendment issue as largely settled by Hanson and Street.”). 
 410. Abood, 431 U.S. at 245 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 411. See id. at 259 (“[E]ven in public employment, ‘a significant impairment 
of First Amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny.’” (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 356, 362 (1976) (plurality opinion))). 
 412. Id. at 255. 
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argues that nothing less than exacting scrutiny can be used to assess 
the constitutionality of a significant impairment of First Amendment 
rights.413 
One can make an argument that the Abood Court did not know 
it was wrong at the time because it believed that agency fees were 
necessary to promote a government interest in labor peace, but that in 
hindsight it was wrongly decided given that millions of public-sector 
employees have been effectively represented by unions in the absence 
of agency fees. Then the next legal question is whether stare decisis 
should prevail. 
Obviously, stare decisis is not rigid.414 If it were, we would still 
have segregated schools under Plessy v. Ferguson,415 and Thurgood 
Marshall would have lost the case of Brown v. Board of Education.416 
As both sides agree, there must be compelling grounds to reverse 
precedent.417 The two sides differ strongly as to whether those 
compelling grounds exist.418 The dissent perceives the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment interests to be smaller and the state’s interests larger.419 
However, the state’s interests are premised on what has proven to be 
an unfounded assertion that agency fees are necessary to maintain a 
single negotiator for employees.420 
As the majority notes, even where agency fees are not allowed, 
unions aggressively campaign for the right to be the exclusive 
 
 413. See id. at 260 (“The justifications offered by the Detroit Board of 
Education must be tested under this settled standard of review.”). 
 414. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 
S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018) (“But as we have often recognized, stare decisis is ‘not an 
inexorable command.’” (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009))).  
 415. 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896) (holding that the Louisiana requirement of 
separate railway cars for different races does not violate the Constitution). 
 416. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overruling the separate but equal doctrine). 
 417. Compare Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478 (“We will not overturn a past decision 
unless there are strong grounds for doing so.”), with id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(“Departures from stare decisis are supposed to be ‘exceptional action[s]’ demanding 
‘special justification[]’ . . . .” (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984))).  
 418. Compare id. at 2486 (majority opinion) (“All these reasons—that 
Abood’s proponents have abandoned its reasoning, that the precedent has proved 
unworkable, that it conflicts with other First Amendment decisions, and that 
subsequent developments have eroded its underpinnings—provide the ‘special 
justification[s]’ for overruling Abood.”), with id. at 2497 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“And 
the majority does not have anything close.”).  
 419. See id. at 2489 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing the state’s interests). 
 420. See id. at 2483 (majority opinion) (noting that experience has shown 
agency shop agreements are unnecessary to support exclusive representation in the 
public sector). 
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negotiator for public employees.421 The dissent’s image of the world is 
inconsistent with reality.422  
On some level, the case comes down to beliefs about the relative 
importance and balancing of the individual’s right to disassociate 
herself from anything to do with a labor union and the government’s 
interest in creating a stronger and more powerful union to negotiate on 
behalf of public employees. For an economist, it is difficult to imagine 
that the government has any legitimate interest in this. A public-sector 
labor union creates monopoly and monopsony conditions. It is the sole 
provider of a permanent labor force to the government, and the 
government is the only purchaser of this labor. These organization 
forms are inefficient.423 
The dissent believes that the underlying economic problem is the 
financial hardship that public-sector labor unions will face if they 
cannot compel free-riders to pay for representation.424 This view 
assumes that public-sector unions fulfill the same role as private-
sector unions negotiating with large companies with monopoly power. 
That is an incorrect view.425 Public-sector unions work to divert public 
resources to public employees in the form of higher wages, better 
benefits, more job security, and similar perks.426 One way to promote 
 
 421. See id. at 2467 n.5. 
 422. See id. (“[I]t is simply not true that unions will refuse to serve as the 
exclusive representative of all employees in the unit if they are not given agency 
fees.”); id. at 2477 (“[A]mple experience [about agency shops] . . . shows that this is 
questionable.”); id. at 2480 (“[D]esignation of a union as exclusive representative and 
the imposition of agency fees are not inextricably linked.”); id. at 2483 (“But, as 
already noted, experience [around agency shops] has shown otherwise.”). 
 423. See HUBBARD & O’BRIEN, supra note 79, at 570 (“Monopoly and 
monopsony have similar effects on the economy: In both cases, a firm’s market power 
results in a lower equilibrium quantity, a deadweight loss, and a reduction in economic 
efficiency compared with a competitive market.”). 
 424. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2490 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
absence of agency fees “creates a collective action problem of nightmarish 
proportions”). 
 425. See id. at 2483 (majority opinion) (discussing differences between 
public-sector union growth and private sector unionism and the fiscal problems 
created by the public-sector unions); DISALVO, supra note 9, at 17 (“[U]nions 
representing government workers are different from those found in the private 
sphere[, and] . . . [t]he economic, legal, and moral case for the two species of unions 
is very different.”). 
 426. See FACTOR, supra note 10, at xvi (“Outrageous concessions to the unions 
don’t drive the government out of business and make you lose your job, like they do 
in the private sector. The government will always be in business. Unwieldy union 
contracts just make the government immensely bigger and more expensive—and 
more burdensome to the taxpayer.”). 
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job security is to utilize a system that rewards seniority over 
performance.427 One way to rapidly increase seniority is to expand the 
bureaucracy and hire more new workers to do more jobs, even if the 
work being done is not that valuable.428 We end up with workers whose 
job is merely to watch other people work.429 Public-sector unions are 
not remedying some unfair advantage held by evil monopolistic 
tycoons. It is reasonable to grant some deference to the sovereign 
states and assume they will treat their employees fairly in the absence 
of a collective bargaining representative. Public-sector unions are not 
working for the public interest.430 They are working for the self-
interest of public-sector employees.431 This is where the more 
significant free-rider problem comes into play. The interests of public-
 
 427. See DISALVO, supra note 9, at 35 (discussing how public-sector unions 
oppose pay-for-performance and other accountability measures and instead fight for 
rules favoring seniority and entrenchment). 
 428. See MUELLER, supra note 11, at 523 (“Government may grow not only 
because increasing expenditures are demanded by citizens, interest groups, or 
legislators, but also because they are demanded by the bureaucracy supplying 
government programs. The government bureaucracies are an independent force, 
which possibly may lead to increasing government size.”).  
 429. Kimberly Kraweic, Building the Basic Course Around Intra-Firm 
Relations, 34 GA. L. REV. 785, 790–91 n.18 (2000) (noting in the footnote that this 
tendency—the trend toward having people watch other people for a living—was 
observed long ago by Theodore Geissel, better known as Dr. Seuss: “Oh, the jobs 
people work at! Out west, near Hawtch-Hawtch, there’s a Hawtch-Hawtcher Bee-
Watcher. His job is to watch . . . [and] to keep both his eyes on the lazy town bee. A 
bee that is watched will work harder, you see. Well . . . he watched and he watched. 
But, in spite of his watch, that bee didn’t work any harder. Not mawtch. So then 
somebody said, ‘Our old bee-watching man just isn’t bee-watching as hard as he can. 
He ought to be watched by another Hawtch-Hawtcher. The thing that we need is a 
Bee-Watcher-Watcher.’ WELL . . . The Bee-Watcher-Watcher watched the Bee-
Watcher. He didn’t watch well. So another Hawtch-Hawtcher had to come in as a 
Watch-Watcher-Watcher. And today all the Hawtchers who live in Hawtch-Hawtch 
are watching on Watch-Watcher-Watchering-Watch, Watch-Watching the Watcher 
who’s watching that bee. You’re not a Hawtch-Hawtcher. You’re lucky, you see.” 
(quoting DR. SEUSS, DID I EVER TELL YOU HOW LUCKY YOU ARE? 26–29 (1973))); 
see also Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against 
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 819, 833–44 (1981). 
 430. See DISALVO, supra note 9, at 34 (“Unlike unions in the private sector, 
government unions have incentives to push for more public employment, which 
increases their ranks, fills their coffers with new dues, and makes them more powerful. 
Therefore, they consistently push for higher taxes and more government activity. Over 
the long term, this can stifle economic growth and pit public and private sector unions 
against each other.”). 
 431. See FACTOR, supra note 10, at xxi (“It is important to realize that 
government employee unions, like all unions, are private organizations. Unions feed 
off the largesse of government for the benefit of their members and union bosses.”). 
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sector employees are relatively cohesive and easy to coordinate, while 
the interests of the taxpaying public are not. No individual member of 
the public will find it worth their time and money to campaign against 
better job security for public-sector employees. 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Kagan asserts that the majority has dictated an end to 
some great “energetic policy debate” where some jurisdictions elect to 
allow agency fees where others do not.432 This is a laughable idea that 
could only be formed inside an ivory tower perspective. Anyone who 
does not have their head buried in the sand would anticipate that where 
agency fees are allowed it is the result of some level of corruption in 
the political process where unions effectively lobbied and supported 
(if not bribed) sympathetic candidates.433 
One can think of monitoring inefficiency in the public sector as 
a public good.434 This is a public good that no one will pay for in the 
private market because their costs exceed their private benefit and they 
cannot exclude the nonpaying members of the public from the 
benefit.435 So unless the government can be trusted to provide unbiased 
monitoring of its own performance, we will have a socially suboptimal 
level of effort expended to reduce inefficiency in government. This is 
the real free-rider problem that should be concerning. The gloom and 
doom of devastation brought on public-sector unions that is predicted 
by the dissent is simply fantasy, as the majority pointed out with the 
empirical fact that millions of public-sector employees are effectively 
represented by unions in the absence of agency fees.  
  
 
 432. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 433. See DISALVO, supra note 9, at 57–59 (discussing how public-sector 
unions work to elect their own managers who will treat them favorably); FACTOR, 
supra note 10, at xv (discussing corrupt system of government employee unions 
channeling campaign contributions to elected officials in exchange for favorable 
legislation). 
 434. See DISALVO, supra note 9, at 211 (“Getting government to be 
responsible, accountable, and reasonably effective is hard.”). 
 435. See id. at 164 (“Public sector unions are mobilized to defend the benefits 
that have accrued to their members, while comparatively unorganized taxpayers see 
little benefit from taking on these issues.”). 
